Topics in applied microeconomics : time allocation and natural resource use on Alaska's North Slope and market power in the U.S. motor carrier industry by Kerkvliet, Joe
AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF  
William E. Nebeskv for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in  Economics  
presented on February 4. 1994.  
Title: Topics  in Applied Microeconomics: Time Allocation and Natural  
Resource Use on Alaska's North Slope and Market Power in the U.S. Motor  
Carrier Industry  
Abstract approved:  
'Joe 1<erkvl iet  
This paper presents two applications of empirical microeconomics  
based on choice theoretic optimization principles.  The first topic  
explores the determinants of subsistence time allocation in a utility  
theoretic model of household production.  The second topic examines firm  
pricing behavior in a deregulated, but concentrated industry setting.  
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the subsistence time versus wage labor time allocations of Alaska's  
North Slope inhabitants using ordered probit based on a household  
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demographic, and cultural influences.  
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allocation process is recursive.  Fourth, we find an inverse  
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subsistence natural resources.  
The second part of this study turns from the individual behavior  
to firm behavior.  During the 1980's, researchers have noted a trend  
towards increased concentration in the gene'ral freight, less-than-
truckload (LTL) portion of the U.S. motor carrier industry.  The purpose  
of this study is to employ new empirical industrial organization  (NEIO)  
techniques to determine whether the more concentrated post-1980, LTL  
motor carrier industry is exerting anti-competitive monopoly pricing  
behavior.  
The NEIO approach is used to formulate the relationship between  
market price and marginal cost in what is referred to as the  
representative firm's 'supply relation.'  The firm's supply relation is  
estimated jointly with the cost function and the factor share equations  
under the assumption that cross equation disturbance terms are  
correlated (SUR).  An instrumental variables procedure is used to test  
and control for correlation between output (on the right hand side) and  
the disturbance terms in the cost and supply equations.  
The results indicate that the trend toward increased industry  
concentration does not imply anti-competitive performance in the sense  
of rising price-cost margins.  Topics in Applied Microeconomics:  
Time Allocation and Natural Resource Use on Alaska's North Slope  
and  
Market Power in the U.S. Motor Carrier Industry  
by  
William E. Nebesky  
A THESIS  
submitted to  
Oregon State University  
in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the  
degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
Completed February 4, 1994  
Commencement June 1994  APPROVED:  
/I" fessfir of Economics  charge of major  
t./  
Head of department of Economics  
Dean of Graduate  hool  
Date thesis is presented  February 4. 1994  
Typed by William E. Nebesky  
Redacted for Privacy
Redacted for Privacy
Redacted for PrivacyACKNOWLEDGEMENT:  
I would like to express my gratitude to the North Slope Borough for its  
generous contribution of the data used for the study, to the members of my  
thesis committee for the support, wisdom, and enthusiasm they readily  
supplied,  and to the generous financial  support of the Oregon State  
University Graduate Faculty of Economics.  This research is dedicated to  
the memory of Professor D. Barton DeLoach.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  
I.	  INTRODUCTION  1  
II.	  TIME ALLOCATION AND NATURAL RESOURCE USE  
ON ALASKA'S NORTH SLOPE  3  
II.1  Introduction	  3  
11.2  Subsistence on the North Slope	  5  
11.3  Theoretic Model of Household Production  7  
11.4  Empirical Model and Data	  16  
11.5  Results	  27  
11.6  Conclusion	  39  
11.7  References Cited	  41  
11.8  Endnotes	  44  
III.	  MARKET POWER IN THE U.S. MOTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY  45  
III.1  Introduction	  45  
111.2  Theoretic Model of Pricing Behavior	  49  
111.3  Empirical Methodology	  52  
111.4  Results	  61  
111.5  Conclusion	  65  
111.6  References Cited	  67  
111.7  Endnotes	  70  
IV.	  CONCLUSION  73  
V.	  BIBLIOGRAPHY  75  
APPENDICES  
Appendix A  81  
Appendix B  82  
Appendix C  84  LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure  Page 
II.1  The Optimal Time Allocation Problem  14 
11.2  The Effect of Fixed Subsistence Inputs  15 LIST OF TABLES  
Page 
Dependent Variable (TIME) Responses 
by Household Ethnicity  17 
Means and Standard Deviations of Independent 
Variables by Amount of Time Allocated to 
Subsistence  20 
11.3  Means and Standard Deviations of Independent 
Variables by Ethnicity  21 
Estimated Model Parameters  30 
Estimated Probabilities and Observed Frequencies 
of TIME  31 
11.6  Marginal Effects for Continuous Explanatory 
Variables  33 
11.7  Marginal Effects for Binary Explanatory Variables  36 
III.1  U.S. Motor Carrier Industry Size and Concentration 
1976  1989  46 
Variable Definitions and Summary Measures  56 
Strategic Differences Between National 
and Regional Strategic Groups in the 
U.S. Motor Carrier Industry  60 
111.4  Coefficient Estimates for the U.S. Motor Carrier 
Industry in 1988  63 
B.1  OLS Coefficient Estimates for Instrumental 
Variable Specification  83 
C.1  Coefficient Estimates for Restricted Model: 
No Strategic Group Effects  85 
C.2  Coefficient Estimates for Intermediate Model: 
Strategic Group Effects on Cost Intercept  86 
C.3  Coefficient Estimates for Intermediate Model: 
Strategic Group Effects on Supply Relation  87 
C.4  Coefficient Estimates for Full Model: 
Strategic Group Effects on Cost Intercept 
and Supply Relation 
88 TOPICS IN APPLIED MICROECONOMICS:  
TIME ALLOCATION AND NATURAL RESOURCE USE ON ALASKA'S NORTH SLOPE  
AND  
MARKET POWER IN THE U.S. MOTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
This research addresses topics in applied microeconomic analysis.  
Two applications are considered.  The analysis in part II focuses on the  
consumer's constrained utility optimization problem.  The usual utility  
theoretic framework is extended along the lines presented in Becker  
(1965) to include time as well as income as a constraint on the  
individual's home production, leisure, and labor market decisions.  The  
theoretical model recognizes that households function  as units of  
consumption and production.  This home production framework is used to  
develop an empirical model that explains Alaska North Slope subsistence  
participation and relates the individual's subsistence time allocation  
decision to his/her labor market participation, as well  as other  
economic, demographic, and cultural variables.  This research  
contributes to a topic of interest in northern economic development: the  
nature of the mixed wage/subsistence economy.  
Part III focuses on the firm's unconstrained profit maximization  
problem.  The analysis draws from the New Empirical Industrial  
Organization theory (Bresnahan, 1986) and Strategic Group theory (Caves  
and Porter, 1977) to present a model of firm pricing behavior in the  
U.S. motor carrier industry.  This industry was transformed by  
regulation reform in 1980, but characterized by an alarming rise in post  
deregulation revenue concentration.  This research provides a greater  
understanding of the extent to which trucking firms exert  2 
anticompetitive pricing behavior in a largely unregulated industry  
environment.1  
The topics covered in this paper share in common several themes  
central to empirical microeconomics.  The analyses in parts II and III  
link theoretical models of agent optimization to empirical models that  
explain the behavior of the agents in question; subsistence home  
production in one case, trucking firm pricing behavior in the other.  
Both analyses consider the interaction among agents; household members  
in one case; rival firms in the other.  4'he topics covered in parts II  
and III are linked further by the quantitative methods used for  
estimation.  Both approaches apply maximum likelihood estimators on a  
cross section of observations for the 1988 time period.  In addition,  
both approaches use multi-stage estimation techniques to control and  
test for non-stochasic explanatory variables.  
Part IV contains a summary and conclusion.  A comprehensive  
bibliography is contained in part V.  3 
II.  TIME ALLOCATION AND NATURAL RESOURCE USE ON ALASKA'S NORTH SLOPE  
II.1 Introduction  
In spite of rapid growth in the industrial sectors of the world's  
economies, the traditional subsistence use of natural resources by  
indigenous people is still critical to many major natural resource  
issues.  Subsistence agriculture may produce tropical deforestation  
(Braga, 1992); Alaska Natives have sued Exxon for oil spill damages to  
marine subsistence resources; and the International Whaling Commission  
(1982) exempted subsistence harvesting from its ban on hunting the  
endangered Bowhead whale.  As these examples illustrate, wise resource  
management often requires an understanding of peoples' decision to use  
renewable resources for subsistence.  
Moreover, resource managers often face a nexus between subsistence  
resource use and Native peoples' entitlements to natural resources.  
Subsistence-based Native claims have been established for salmon and  
steelhead in Canadian and Northwest rivers (Randolph, 1992; and  
Pinkerton, 1989), Arctic Bowhead whales, and game and fish in Alaska  
(Morehouse, 1984; and Brown and Burch, 1992), the Canadian Arctic (Post  
and Colin, 1991), and many western states.  Similar claims are being  
pressed currently and it is increasingly important for managers to  
understand differences in resource use patterns between Native and non- 
Native users.  
Yet, with the notable exceptions of Dean (1963) and Stabler  
(1990), little economic research addresses subsistence behavior nor  
potential differences between Native and non-Native people.  This study  4 
starts to fill this gap by explaining subsistence behavior using micro  
data and a model that is theoretically grounded in the household  
production framework.  Our data include the subsistence time allocations  
made by Alaska's North Slope inhabitants, both Inupiat and non-Inupiat  
people.  Subsistence activities include working on or supporting a  
whaling crew; hunting seal, walrus, waterfowl, moose, or caribou;  
trapping; picking berries; sewing skins; and building sleds or boats  
(Nebesky, 1989).  
We derive and estimate ordered probit equations for time devoted  
to subsistence activities relative to time spent in wage labor.  We  
partially explain these time allocations using variables measuring labor  
supply decisions as well as demographic and cultural influences.  
The next section describes the wage/subsistence North Slope  
lifestyle.  Section 11.3 looks at the allocation of time to subsistence  
activities as a household production problem.  The empirical model and  
the data is presented in Section 11.4.  Sections 11.5 and 11.6 give  
statistical results conclusions.  5 
11.2  Subsistence on the North Slope  
Alaska's North Slope Borough lies north of the Brooks Range, and  
contains 94,887 square miles, including the Prudhoe Bay oil field and  
most of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. It is home to 4,100 Inupiat  
Eskimos, residing primarily in eight villages with 200 to 3,000 people.  
Villages occupy traditional sites chosen for proximity to marine mammal  
populations and caribou migration routes.  
The North Slope economy is a mix of subsistence harvesting and  
wage employment.'  With Prudhoe Bay oil development, total North Slope  
employment increased from 1,900 to over 10,000 from 1970 to 1986 (Bureau  
of Economic Analysis, 1987).  The Prudhoe Bay oil complex workforce  
peaked at 7000 in the early 1980's, but is now less than 4,000.  Beyond  
direct employment, the Prudhoe complex provides a property tax base that  
supports Borough public spending.  Since 1984, falling oil prices and  
production have led the region's economic contraction and now the  
primary outside economic stimuli are government and Arctic Slope  
Regional Corporation (ASRC) spending.'  
Except for subsistence food, most goods are imported and local  
commerce is mostly confined to village stores.  Barrow holds half of the  
region's 5,700 residents and 60 percent of its jobs and is the region's  
transportation hub and governmental headquarters.  
Over half of North Slope households engage in subsistence and the  
same proportion of households obtain at least half of total meat and  
fish from subsistence harvests (Kruse, 1992).  Harvests range from 201  
to 521 pounds per capita of marine and terrestrial mammals, fish, birds,  
and other resources (Braund et al., 1988).  Bowhead whale and caribou  6 
account for two-thirds of the total.  Nearly all is consumed in the home  
or given away.3  By comparison, per capita meat consumption in Western  
states averages 222 pounds (Wolfe and Walker, 1987).  
Subsistence harvesting is a year-round process.'  Spring whaling  
in May and June is preceded by weeks of sealskin boat mending, trail  
building, and hazardous snow machine travel to the edge of the icepack  
to establish whaling camps.  In late June, successful whaling crews host  
the Nalukataq celebration.  This event provides an occasion for harvest  
redistribution within the community and marks the transition from Spring  
to Summer harvesting.  With the breakup of shorefast ice, bearded seal  
hunting begins.  Summer harvests also include coastal and inland fish,  
waterfowl, and caribou.  
Whaling resumes in September along with intensive caribou hunting.  
Fishing and caribou hunting continue into October, shifting to inland  
camps accessed by snow machine.  By late fall lessening daylight and  
unstable weather restrict travel and by November most inland camps are  
disbanded.  Caribou hunting continues locally into December.  Seal,  
caribou, and furs are pursued from January to March.  In early March,  
preparations begin again for Spring whaling.  7 
11.3  Theoretical Model of Household Production  
Subsistence harvesting combines labor with operating inputs  
(gasoline, ammunition) and capital (skiff, motor, tent, firearms, and  
tools) to harvest, prepare, and distribute subsistence products.  
Viewing subsistence as production highlights the trade-offs in the use  
of time and wage income.  Household members allocate time between  
subsistence activities, wage labor, and leisure.  Also, subsistence  
harvesting often uses inputs requiring substantial cash outlays.  For  
example, it costs over $10,000 ($1982) per season to outfit a whaling  
crew (International Whaling Commission, 1982).  The required cash is  
often obtained from wage labor and income must be allocated between  
subsistence inputs and competing purchases.  
Although increasing access to the wage labor market may increase  
some economic opportunities, previous authors offer competing views on  
the implications of wage opportunities for subsistence lifestyles.  The  
use of cash for subsistence capital implies that, contrary to previous  
cultural norms, success in subsistence is tied to job market success  
(Van Stone, 1960; Wolfe, 1979; and Chance, 1987).  This led Dryzek and  
Young (1985) to argue that subsistence capital intensification weakens  
traditional lifestyles and village cohesion.  Further, wage/subsistence  
complementarity, if it holds, implies that cyclic economic downturns  
will be magnified by  corresponding reductions in subsistence harvests.  
For the North Slope, Prudhoe oil production will fall to half of 1989  
levels by 2000 (Berman, et al., 1990).  Under complementarity, the  
adverse economic effects of oil depletion will be magnified.  8 
Alternatively, Wolfe (1979) and Wolfe, et al. (1984) argue that  
the potentially destabilizing effects of wages are offset by sharing  
rules among village households.  The traditional pooling of resources  
and harvests is adapted to market relationships, mitigates the larger  
inequities, and continues to play a central role in the village.  Kruse  
(1992) supports this view, finding that a decade of expanding wage  
participation has seen increasing Inupiat subsistence activities.  
He argues that the continuing importance of subsistence activities lies  
partially in the associated process benefits or satisfaction beyond that  
obtained directly in consumption.  
Some process benefits, if they occur, are related to the role of  
subsistence harvests in cultural cohesion and community wealth  
redistributions.  The Inupiat's communal pattern of sharing food  
harvests, especially whales, supports the traditional social, political,  
and economic structure (Sahlins, 1972; Brown and Burch, 1992;  
International Whaling Commission, 1982).  On the North Slope, an average  
14.6 percent of all meat and fish consumed is received as gifts from  
other households.  Similarly, households gave away an average 17 percent  
of their harvests.  These percentages are five to seven times larger for  
Inupiats than for non-Inupiats (Nebesky, 1989).  
In this paper, subsistence harvests are treated as an intermediate  
activity in the home production model (HPM).  In HPM, households members  
are both producers and consumers, maximizing utility by combining  
"capital goods, raw materials and labor to clean, feed, procreate and  
otherwise produce useful commodities" (Becker, 1965).  Besides  
incorporating time into the household's resource constraint, HPM can  
account for process benefits and wage adjustments.  9 
In HPM commodities replace goods as a utility function arguments.  
Commodities are the outputs of home production functions that combine  
time, market goods, and, for this paper, subsistence resources.  The  
model predicts time allocations between leisure, work, and home  
production depending on time's scarcity, possible direct utility from  
intermediate activities, the stock of human capital, and possibly  
exogenous wage labor supply.  
To motivate the empirical model, consider an example of a the  
household member choosing between two intermediate commodities: food  
gathered using subsistence methods, Zs,  and food gathered from grocery  
markets, Zm, both used to produce meals at home, Zm.  Both intermediate  
activities, Zs and Zm, use time and goods inputs, X, and T in the  
production activities  
j = S,M .  (1)  Zi4PC7 Ti),  
Home meals production is given by  
ZE =  ZH(ZsO,;le, Xii, TR)  (2) 
For example, XH may include cooking fuel, XM store-bought groceries, TM  
shopping time, Xs ammunition.  T5 may include whaling camp preparation  
as well as whale butchering and distributing.  
The household member's utility function is  
U=U[Zip,Zse, Zp, Zpp, ;0],  (3) 
where ZN() and ZL() are wage labor and leisure and are of the same 
form as (1).  Zm may give positive, negative, or zero utility and 
require market inputs, XN, such as child care.  If wage labor does not 10 
involve market inputs, then the work and wage labor are likely to be the  
same (ZN=TN).  
In HPM, a time and income resource constraint replaces the  
standard budget constraint.  The constraint form depends on whether or  
not wage labor is endogenous. If this is so, subsistence production may  
be increased by reducing wage labor.  The household is constrained by  
total time  
(4) Eri=t 
0 
and an income-expenditure equality  
EIA  + V,  (5) 
where 0={i1i=H,S,M,N,I.}, V is non-labor income, and w is the fixed wage  
rate (see Gronau, 1986).  
The utility maximizing household member solves  
gwrN+11-EPeY)  g(T-ET),  (6)  z L = 6140,2V),zmazNazLe]  
Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions for a maximum include  
ui  u.(azdazi) - Ani s 0  (7a) 
[ui  uH(azdazi)  Anil Zi  = 0  for i = 0,  (7b) 
where ui=aU/aZi, ice.  The shadow price of commodity i,  + Witp  is  
a function of the inverses of the marginal products of goods Xi  11 
(x,=aX,/aZ,) and time T, (ti=aTiazo.  The ratio of the marginal utility  
of time and income, ( =0., measures time scarcity.5  
The equilibrium wage labor time allocation satisfies  
luN  XN +  PN  (s)  (8a) 
tN  tN 
[1 uN  xN +w -PN  5 w Z =0.  (8b) 
N 
If wage labor does not generate utility or disutility (au/aTN=o) and  
market inputs associated with work are absent (x.=0), then the shadow  
price of time is equal to the wage rate.  
Figure II.1 follows Stabler (1990) and illustrates the optimal  
time allocation problem.  Home cooked meals, our representative  
consumption good, is measured on the vertical axis and time is measured  
on the horizontal axis.  The curve Y,UVT is the home production  
possibilities frontier using only subsistence inputs.  Because home  
production involves fixed costs for subsistence inputs, k, the point Y,  
dominates all points along Y,U.  VYmWH is home production using a  
combination of subsistence and wage labor.  The frontier Y.UVYmWH is  
ZH(.).  
The optimal time allocation occurs at the tangency between an iso-
utility curve and 4.  Figure 1 depicts four classes of equilibrium,  
including: (1) all leisure (point Ys), (2) subsistence participation  
with no wage labor (points on UV), (3) zero subsistence, wage labor NL,  
and leisure ON (point Y.), and (4) time allocated to subsistence, wage  
labor, and leisure (points on WH).  The interior optimum, Eo, depicts an  12 
equilibrium in which the individual works full time (NL), allocates SN  
to subsistence, and enjoys OS leisure.  
Consider now the influence of experience, age, and other cultural  
factors on ZH.  Regular exposure to subsistence activities shapes the  
individual's hunting skills and access to community resources.  So, a  
senior, more experienced Inupiat whale hunter is likely to be more  
skilled than the younger, less experienced hunter and face a ZH of 11,-
kT, if he doesn't work for wages, and Ym-kH', if he does.  Labor market  
opportunities remain unchanged.  His increased productivity is likely to  
result in an increase in the time allocated to subsistence and a  
decrease in wage labor.  The new equilibrium, E depicts a common case  
in the North Slope, where leisure time is OS', subsistence time is S'L,  
and the senior whale hunter does not work for wages.  
Stabler (1990) uses this framework to explain decreases in  
subsistence participation in response to an increase in the wage rate or  
a decreases in the probability of full time employment.  One could  
extend Stabler's (1990) model to show that when employment policies  
provide for work schedule flexibility (eg., subsistence leave) the  
individual may achieve higher utility by switching from full time  
employment and some subsistence participation to a combination of part  
time employment and greater subsistence participation.  Complete work  
schedule flexibility implies that labor force participation is  
endogenous.  
We extend this framework to further examine the effect of fixed  
subsistence inputs, k.  Consider the initial tangency at Et, on curve  
YmWH in Figure 11.2.  The individual works NL, allocates SN to  
subsistence and OS to leisure.  Exiting the wage labor force or total  13 
job loss has two effects.  First, the time available for subsistence and  
leisure increases.  This results in a shift from tangency E0 to El on  
curve Y,-kUT assuming k and 4 remain unchanged.  
However, a likely second effect of sharply declining wage labor  
income is reduced expenditures on fixed subsistence inputs and lower  
marginal productivity for subsistence time.  This effect is depicted by  
the flattened slope of Y,-k'U'T', compared to Y,-kUT, where k'<k.  The  
tangency E2 implies less time allocated to subsistence than when the  
individual worked (S'L < SN).  This outcome illustrates the cash- 
dependent nature of modern subsistence technology and complimentary  
between wage labor and subsistence participation (Van Stone, 1960).  14 
Figure II.1  
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Figure 11.2  
The Effect of Fixed Subsistence Inputs  
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11.4  Empirical Model and Data  
The above discussion considers continuous time allocations between  
subsistence, wage labor, and leisure.  However, the available data  
contain only information on discrete subsistence time allocations  
relative to wage labor.  The dependent variable that we seek to explain,  
TIME, is obtained from the question:6  
"During [the last] twelve-month period, did you spend MORE  
TIME, about the SAME TIME, or LESS TIME engaged in  
subsistence activities, than you did at your job?"  
In addition to MORE, SAME, and LESS, a respondent is placed in a  
NONE category if responses to other questions indicate zero subsistence  
time allocation.  A non-working respondent with any subsistence activity  
is assigned to MORE.  The dependent variable, TIME, is a ranking of  
subsistence intensity relative to wage labor participation using the  
following ordered values: TIMEa0 (NONE), TIMEal (LESS), TIMEa2 (SAME),  
and TIMEa3 (MORE).  TIME responses, sorted by ethnicity, are summarized  
in Table II.1.  The data are from a 1988 survey of 1,688 Inupiat and 731  
non-Inupiat adult residents of the eight North Slope villages (Nebesky,  
1989).7  
As a measure of the relative intensity of subsistence activity,  
TIME has several advantages.  First, this relative measure focuses  
attention on a policy issue central to northern economic development:  
wage labor versus subsistence (Van Stone, 1960; Wolfe, 1979; Hobart,  
1982; Stabler, 1990; and Kruse, 1992).  Second, the question is easy to  
administer and is less intrusive than other measures of subsistence  
participation that require detailed time logs or recollection and it may  17 
TABLE II.1  
Dependent Variable (TIME) Responses  
by Household Ethnicity  
(Proportion of sample in parentheses)  
TIME  ETHNICITY  
Definition  Category  Discrete  Non- Inupiat  Total  
Value  Inupiat  
No subsistence  NONEa  0  550  602  1152  
time.  (.75)  (.36)  (47.6)  
Less subsistence  LESS  1  163  631  794  
time than wage  (.22)  (.37)  (32.8)  
labor time  
Equal  SAME  2  8  206  214  
subsistence and  (.01)  (.12)  (8.8)  
wage labor time  
More subsistence  MOREb  3  10  249  259  
time than wage  (.01)  (.15)  (10.7)  
labor time  
Total  731  1688  2419  
(30.2)  (69.8)  (100)  
a  Allocates no time to subsistence  
'  Unemployed respondents that participated in subsistence  
harvesting are assigned to this category.  
be more accurate.  Finally, TIME provides a natural bridge between  
heterogeneous subsistence and wage activities.  A 91 percent response  
rate shows that respondents easily used time spent in wage labor as a  
reference point from which to measure subsistence activity.  
The discrete observations on TIME do not provide sufficient  
information to estimate a HPM of the type depicted in Figures 1 and 2.  
However, these data can be placed in a latent utility framework.  To  
illustrate, consider again the North Slope villager facing choices among  
differing levels of subsistence hunting (Zs) to produce home cooked  18 
meals (Z,).  For simplicity, assume Z= -1-N=T,,, that is, wage labor time is  
fixed.  
The model is built around the underlying relationship  
Y* = U [ ZipZ.S., ZAp TN ,ZJT  11 [ Zp ZS,Zi e TN,  4  =  13 1 W  4.  e,  (9) 
where y* is the unobserved difference in utility obtained from differing  
subsistence versus grocery shopping strategies.  In particular, the left  
hand bracketed term in (9) is utility when time allocated to subsistence  
exceeds wage labor time.  The right hand bracketed term in (9) is  
utility when subsistence participation is zero.  The unobserved utility  
differences, y*, map into levels of subsistence participation relative  
to wage labor according to the following observed categories  
TIME a 0  if y*  0  NONE  
TIME E 1  if 0 < y* 5. Al  LESS than job  
TIME E 2  if Al < Y* 5- A2  SAME as job  
TIME = 3  if A2  y*  MORE than job,  
where the unknown latent utility threshold parameters AI and A2 are  
estimated along with 0 under the assumption, 0 < AI < A2, assuring that  
all probabilities for the ordered choices are positive (Greene, 1990).  
We can estimate the probability of the four ordered choices.  
Assuming that E.-lid N(0,1), the probabilities of the four ordered time  
categories are  19 
P[TIME =O] = 0(  - 13IW) 
P[TIME=1] = flt(g/  VW) - el)(  PIW) 
(10) 
P[77ME=2] = 0(112 - PIW) - 4)(111  PIW) 
P[TIME=3] = 1  4)(112  'VW), 
where t is the normal cumulative distribution function.  Parameter  
estimates are obtained by solving  
MA 
logl = log[Y0*0 (-/P/W)+Y1*(0(p.i-bifV)  (I) (-WW)) b,X p.pp.2 
+ Y2*(0 (112-b/W)  4)(111 - 1114)) + Y3*(1-4) (t42 -WOO)]  2 
where Vial if TIME=i and zero otherwise, i=0,1,2,3.  
Three categories of variables are used to explain TIME:  labor  
supply, demographic, and cultural.  In Table 11.2, all the independent  
variables are cross tabulated with TIME.  Descriptive statistics are  
shown in Table 11.3 by ethnicity.  The reader is reminded that the  
dependent variable, TIME, is not absolute.  It measures subsistence  
participation relative to wage labor supply.  The labor supply variables  
are number of months the respondent was employed in the past year  
(MWORK), the number of employed months for all other household members  
(HHWORK), and a set of binary occupational variables.  
MWORK measures of the respondent's wage labor supply and, since  
time is allocated between wage labor, subsistence participation, and  
leisure, MWORK is likely to influence subsistence.8  The correct  
econometric model of subsistence time allocation relative to wage labor  
depends on the nature of this influence.  A simultaneous equations  
approach is appropriate if subsistence participation and MWORK are  
jointly determined.  Conversely, a recursive approach is suggested if  20 
TABLE 11.2  
Means and Standard Deviations of Independent Variables  
by Amount of Time Allocated to Subsistence*  
MORE  Total  NONE  LESS  SAME  
4.26  HHS  3.96  4.36  4.86  4.76  
(2.14)  (2.17)  (2.16)  (2.19)  (2.18)  
MWORK  7.47  8.97  7.37  2.69  7.44 
(4.95)  (3.86)  (4.48)  (4.15)  (4.83) 
HHWORK  11.61  10.38  10.39  10.64  10.99 
(10.25)  (8.97)  (9.13)  (9.38)  (10.59) 
GET (%)  11.99  15.46  19.50  19.46  14.59 
(21.34)  (20.76)  (23.47)  (24.16)  (21.84) 
GIVE (%)  8.59  23.92  26.90  28.49  17.37 
(17.08)  (23.50)  (21.79)  (25.45)  (22.43) 
LOCAL (%)  50.79  55.56  65.68  66.66  53.37 
(30.75)  (28.62)  (26.32)  (23.64)  (29.54) 
AGE  36.33  35.80  35.35  41.79  36.66 
(14.33)  (11.72)  (12.18)  (17.15)  (13.80) 
SCH  12.17  11.97  10.87  9.34  11.68 
(3.53)  (3.04)  (2.81)  (3.99)  (3.48) 
HHY" ($1000)  60.8  59.5  44.3  37.1  56.4 
(43.7)  (40.5)  (34.5)  (28.0)  (41.2) 
ETHNIC  52.3  79.5  96.3  96.1  69.8 
(%Inupiat)  (50.0)  (40.4)  (19.0)  (19.3)  (45.9) 
MAR  47.4  55.4  50.0  52.1  51.3 
(% Married)  (50.0)  (49.7)  (50.1)  (50.1)  (50.0) 
GENDER  42.4  64.0  65.4  57.9  53.2 
(% Male)  (49.3)  (48.0)  (47.7)  (49.5)  (49.9) 
BARROW  69.5  53.0  46.7  42.1  59.2 
(% Residing)  (46.1)  (49.9)  (50.0)  (49.5)  (49.2) 
WJOB (%)  56.9  54.0  42.1  19.7  50.6 
(49.6)  (49.9)  (49.5)  (39.8)  (50.0) 
NOJOB (%)  23.8  6.7  14.0  55.2  20.7 
(42.6)  (25.0)  (34.8)  (49.8)  (40.5) 
BJOB (%)  19.4  39.3  43.9  25.1  28.7 
(39.5)  (48.9)  (49.8)  (43.4)  (45.2) 
N  1,152  794  214  259  2419 
' Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Equals household income; not included in estimated model. 21 
TABLE 11.3  
Means and Standard Deviations of Independent Variables  
by Ethnicity'  
VARIABLE  Non 
Inupiat  Inupiat  Total 
HHS  3.12 
(1.72) 
4.75 
(2.17) 
4.26 
(2.18) 
MWORK  10.05 
(3.55) 
6.31 
(4.87) 
7.44 
(4.83) 
HHWORK  12.25 
(10.42) 
10.45 
(9.28) 
10.99 
(10.59) 
GET (%)  3.34 
(11.02) 
19.47 
(23.51) 
14.59 
(21.84) 
GIVE (%)  3.84 
(12.64) 
23.23 
(23.20) 
17.37 
(22.43) 
LOCAL (%)  33.96 
(26.24) 
64.65 
(25.84) 
55.37 
(29.54) 
AGE  37.08 
(11.40) 
36.47 
(14.72) 
36.66 
(13.80) 
SCH  14.32 
(2.33) 
10.54 
(3.27) 
11.68 
(3.48) 
HHY" ($1000)  $82.9 
(45.2) 
$44.9 
(33.4) 
$56.7 
(41.2) 
MAR (% Married)  57.5 
(49.3) 
48.5 
(50.0) 
51.3 
(50.0) 
GENDER (% Male)  53.1 
(49.9) 
53.2 
(49.9) 
53.2 
(49.9) 
BARROW (% Residing)  87.0 
(33.7) 
47.1 
(49.9) 
59.2 
(49.2) 
WJOB (%)  73.2 
(44.3) 
40.9 
(49.2) 
50.6 
(50.0) 
NOJOB (%)  8.3 
(27.7) 
26.0 
(43.9) 
20.7 
(40.5) 
BJOB (%)  18.5 
(38.8) 
33.1 
(47.1) 
28.7 
(45.2) 
N  731  1688  2419 
' Standard deviations in parentheses.  
Equals household income; not included in estimated model.  22 
MWORK is determined first and then the remaining time is allocated  
between subsistence and leisure.°  An empirical test for the exogeneity  
of MWORK and its implications are considered in the next section.  
As shown in Table 11.3, on average MWORK is lower and more  
variable for Inupiats (6.31 months) than for non-Inupiats (10.05  
months).  In Table 11.2, MWORK declines sharply with subsistence  
activity for respondents in SAME and MORE.  Respondents with modest  
subsistence participation (LESS) averaged more time allocated to labor  
supply (8.97 months) than those in NONE (7.47 months).  This reflects a  
higher concentration of labor force intensive non-Inupiats in LESS.  
Also, it indicates that some respondents, including the disabled, the  
aged, and students, are active in neither the wage nor subsistence  
markets.  
We include all other household members' wage labor, HHWORK, to  
control for the possible influence of collective household decisions on  
the individual's subsistence time choice, but the sign of its effect is  
ambiguous.  Other household members' wage labor may support the  
respondent's subsistence effort, but may also induce the individual to  
intensify labor market participation ((Brown and Burch, 1992; Kruse,  
1992).  Table 11.2 suggests that HHWORK varies little with TIME, while  
Table 11.3 shows that the average level of HHWORK is higher for non- 
Inupiats (12.25) than Inupiat respondents (10.45).  
Three binary variables measure the respondent's occupation.  WJOB  
and BJOB are white and blue collar jobs from U.S. Census  
classifications.  Those not in the labor force or unemployed are  
classified as NOJOB.  Occupation and ethnicity are strongly related.  
Inupiats are more likely to be in BJOB (.33) or NOJOB (.26) than non-23 
Inupiats, who are mostly in WJOB (.73) and rarely NOJOB (.08).  We  
choose BJOB as the reference and we expect a relatively higher (lower)  
level of subsistence activity for NOJOB (WJOB) because of the effect of  
lower (higher) wage rates on the opportunity cost of subsistence time.  
The demographic variables are age, gender, marital status,  
education, household size and geographic location.  Since wage labor  
markets developed only recently on the North Slope, AGE may proxy human  
subsistence capital and identification with the traditional cultural  
(Kruse, 1992).  We expect age to be directly related to subsistence  
activity.  
GENDERE1 for male respondents and zero for female.  Male dominance  
in subsistence harvesting activity would imply a positive association  
with TIME.  However, the data used in this study are based on a broad  
definition of subsistence, encompassing food processing, sewing,  
gathering, and camp preparation.  Since many of these functions are  
carried out by women, the expected sign for GENDER is ambiguous.  
MARE1 if the respondent is married and zero otherwise.  
Subsistence requires household members to coordinate a set of  
specialized activities such as butchering, storage, distribution,  
equipment repair, radio communications, camp preparation.  Following  
Kruse (1992), MAR is interpreted as a measure of household cohesion and  
is expected to have a positive impact on TIME.  
The number of years of formal education (SCH) may affect  
subsistence in two ways.  First, an increase in schooling may result in  
(or result from) a disaffection with the traditional lifestyle and imply  
a decrease in subsistence.  Second, an increase in SCH may indirectly  
measure the influence of higher wage offers.  This could have the  24 
negative effect of increasing the opportunity cost of subsistence  
activity or the positive effect of encouraging the purchase of variable  
and capital subsistence inputs.  Kruse (1992) finds that between 1977  
and 1988 subsistence activities among Inupiat men increased across all  
levels of SCH, but he does not speculate on the cause.  In contrast with  
Kruse, Stabler (1990) finds that subsistence participation is inversely  
related to educational attainment  among English-speaking Native males,  
age 15-44, in Canada's Northwest Territories (NWT).  These differences  
may be due in part to fundamental differences in economic conditions  
faced by Alaska North Slope and Canadian NWT Native populations.  
Household size (HHS), the number of household members, is a proxy  
for the household's structure and averages 4.3 persons.  Twenty-six  
percent of Inupiat and 17 percent of non-Inupiat households are extended  
families with as many as 14 persons.  The larger households tend to  
include extended kin members whose presence is likely to facilitate  
cooperation in subsistence activities, increase the demand for  
subsistence products, and indicate a greater attachment to traditional  
lifestyles.  We expect a positive relationship between HHS and TIME.  
Usher (1981) and Kruse (1992) argue that residents of larger  
villages will have stronger attachments to the market economy.  Barrow  
is the largest of the eight North Slope villages.  We include a dummy  
variable BRWal if the respondent resides in Barrow and zero otherwise.  
Cultural variables include ethnicity, local propensity to spend,  
and two variables that capture broader sharing relationships that are  
important to community cohesion and to the preservation of Inupiat  
culture (Wolfe et al., 1984 and Kruse, 1992).  The variables GIVE and  
GET characterize the extent to which a household is oriented toward the  25 
extended family and community.  GIVE is obtained from the question:  
"Over the past year, what percent of all the meat and fish  
that you and members of your household harvested did you  
give away?"  
GET is obtained from the question:  
"Over the past year, what percent of all the meat and fish  
that you and members of your household consumed came from  
other households (who may or may not be relatives)?"  
In both cases the respondent was asked to indicate a percentage  
between zero and 100.  The motivation for these sharing variables stems  
from the debate over the resilience of generalized reciprocity in the  
modern mixed village economy and its importance as a form of economic  
security and as a determinant of subsistence participation (Wolfe 1979,  
Hobart 1982, Dryzek and Young, 1985).  As shown in Tables 11.2 and 11.3,  
GIVE and GET both exhibit a strong positive relationship with TIME and  
ethnicity.  
The variable LOCAL is the fraction of household income spent in  
the village.  This is an indicator of attachment to and involvement in  
local affairs, including commerce.  We expect a positive sign for this  
variable.  
We allow for differences in the subsistence activity of Inupiats  
and non-Inupiats in two ways.  First, we include a binary variable  
ETHNICal if the respondent's household head or spouse of household head  
is Inupiat.  The expected sign is positive reflecting what Stigler and  
Becker (1977) would describe as cultural effects on the opportunity cost  
of subsistence hunting.  
Second, we allow the effect of each explanatory variable to vary  
with ethnicity by including interaction terms between ETHNIC and all  26 
other variables.  In the discussion below, we refer to the estimates  
corresponding to this set of variables as indigenous interaction terms  
and adopt the notation of attaching a suffix D to the explanatory  
variable name (e.g. MAR for married non-Inupiat and MARD for married  
Inupiat).  27 
11.5  Results  
In this section, we conduct two independent model specification  
tests using (11). Conditional on the accepted specification, we report  
and interpret the results as well as the estimated marginal effects of  
the explanatory variables.  
We first conduct a likelihood ratio test of the restriction that  
all the indigenous interaction terms are zero.  Under the null,  
ethnicity has no structural impact and the probability of subsistence  
activity for Inupiat versus non-Inupiat respondents differs only in the  
intercept.  We reject the null with a prob-value4, since the test  
statistic is X2 =51.3 and the critical X2.05,13= 22.36.  This result is  
important because it provides evidence that the indigenous Inupiat  
people use and value natural resources in a manner different from non- 
Inupiats.  This implies that optimal management policies will vary with  
the ethnicity of the resource owner and that resource valuations  
estimated with surveys of non-Natives are not likely to be valid for  
resources with Native entitlements.  
Second, we conduct and independent test for the exogeneity MWORK  
using Grogger's (1990) method.  Fitted values for MWORK are obtained  
from a 13-choice (0 through 12 months) ordered probit model.  For  
instruments we use HHS, LOCAL, AGE, ETHNIC, SCH, GENDER, MAR, BRW, and a  
binary variable for private versus public sector employment.  
The test statistic is x2=1.401, compared to the critical  
X2.05,1 =3.84 and we fail to reject the null hypothesis of exogenous MWORK.  
In addition to its econometric expediency, this result implies that  
optimal the time allocation for home produced subsistence commodities is  28 
not determined jointly with wage labor time allocation.  The home  
production time allocation process may be recursive, beginning with the  
labor force participation decision.  
Institutional factors may account for this result.  First, modern  
subsistence practices require cash outlays, which in turn require  
earnings.  In addition to coordination among extended household and  
community members, subsistence requires some amount of labor force  
participation.  Once employed, the individual is subject to labor market  
rigidities that, to some extent, locks them into the wage-consumption  
cycle.  
Second, the personnel policies of many North Slope employers often  
allow for unpaid subsistence leave.  This arrangement is compatible with  
the subsistence lifestyle and it creates an additional incentive for  
labor market participation.  The North Slope labor force participation  
decision may be fixed, as the data suggest, but at lower average levels  
compatible with subsistence time allocation requirements.  This  
explanation is consistent with lower average MWORK for Inupiat residents  
than for non-Inupiat residents (Table 11.3).  These findings suggest  
that the subsistence leave policies facilitate intermediate home  
production.  
Estimation results for the accepted model are summarized in Tables  
11.4-7.  Except for the intercept and the shifter, ETHNIC, the parameter  
estimates in Table 11.4 are presented in pairs consisting of the  
original variable and its indigenous interaction counterpart.  As shown  
in Table 11.4, several variables have statistically significant  
coefficients, including at least one from each category: labor supply,  
demographic, and cultural.  In addition, likelihood ratio test results  29 
indicate that the accepted model exhibits far greater explanatory power  
than a naive model that contains only an intercept term (the test  
statistic 708.58 exceeds the critical value, X2.05,29=42.6).  
Table 11.5 indicated goodness of fit by comparing predicted  
probabilities for TIME with observed frequencies.  Overall, the model  
correctly predicts TIME for 82 percent of Inupiats and 97 percent of  
non-Inupiats.  However, the model tends to overstate Inupiat  
probabilities for NONE and LESS and understate for SAME and MORE.  The  
reverse occurs for non-Inupiats.  
The interpretation of ordered probit coefficients is complicated  
since a coefficient's algebraic sign determines the sign of the marginal  
effect only for the first and last ordered categories (Greene, 1990).  
For the continuous variables in W the marginal effects are  
ap[TIME=0]  4)(biff)b
Ow 
ap[TIME=1]  (C-biw)  4) ( p.1 -b iFv) ) b
Ow 
(12) 
ap[T.Z-ME=2] 
(.(p1-b1W)  ( p.2 -b iff) ) b
Ow 
ap[TIME=3] 
4) (112  b/W) b,
Ow 
where 0 is the normal probability density function.  For  >O (<0), an  
increase in W shifts the density function rightward and unambiguously  
decreases (increases) the P[TIME=0] and increases (decreases) the  
P[TIME=3].  However, the direction of change in the middle two  
categories is ambiguous and depends on the densities.  For all cells,  
the magnitudes of the marginal effects depend on the point of evaluation  
of W.  Table 11.6 gives the estimated marginal effects on the  30 
TABLE 11.4  
Estimated Model Parameters  
Variable  Estimate  T-ratio  Variable Mean 
Constant  -0.648983  -1.24657  - --
Labor Supply 
MWORK  0.014659  0.62796  10.053 
MWORKD  -0.046802  -1.90089**  6.311 
HHWORK  -0.021767  -2.94766*  12.248 
HHWORKD  0.021803  2.68242*  10.452 
WJOB  0.000201  0.00135  0.732 
W3080  -0.075563  -0.45464  0.409 
NOJOB  -0.216942  -0.64757  0.083 
NOJOBD  0.087307  0.25137  0.260 
Demographic 
HHS  0.015221  0.39234  3.120 
HHSO  -0.008361  -0.20121  4 749 
AGE  -0.005996  -1.15202  37.079 
AGED  0.012976  2.23772*  36.474 
SCH  -0.010252  -0.38944  14.317 
SCHO  0.019916  0.69426  10.543 
GENDER  0.343482  2.94433*  0.531 
GENDERD  0.093334  0.70045  0.532 
MAR  0.355329  2.97557*  0.577 
HARD  -0.196123  -1.46113  0 485 
BRW  -0.149301  -0.99181  0.870 
BRWD  0.095207  0.59161  0.471 31 
TABLE II. 4 (Continued)  
Estimated Model Parameters  
T-ratio  Variable Mean  I  
I  
I  Variable  Estimate  
Cultural  
ETHNIC  0.453284  0.79937  0.698  
GIVE  0.025577  7.40066*  3.837  
DIVED  -0.015008  -4.11269*  23.232  
GET  0.008643  2.04095*  3.343  
6ETD  -0.009057  -2.05992*  19.467  
LOCAL  -0.002746  -1.24848  33.959  
LOCALD  0.002244  0.91167  64.648  
Latent Parameters  
p1  1.10649  64.9825  
p2  1.55041  31.1115  
Log of Likelihood Function: -2482.52  
Likelihood Ratio Index:  .1249  
Likelihood Ratio Test (DF=29)  708.58  
Note:  * = .05 Significance  ** = .10 Significance  
TABLE 11.5  
Estimated Probabilities and Observed Frequencies for TIME  
Subsistence  
TIME  Inupiat  Non-Inupiat  
Allocation  
Decision   Estimated  Observed  Estimated  Observed  
Frequency  Frequency  Frequency  Frequency  
NONE  .426  .357  .747  .752 
LESS than Job  .395  .374  .215  .223 
SAME as Job  .093  .122  .025  .011 
MORE than Job  .087  .148  .013  .014 32 
probabilities of each TIME category, evaluated at the Inupiat and non- 
Inupiat sample means.  
Importantly, the marginal effects are of opposite signs for  
Inupiats versus non-Inupiats in the case of MWORK, AGE, and SCH.  An  
increase in MWORK increases Prob[TIME=0] for Inupiats and somewhat  
uniformly decreases the probability of higher categories of TIME.  The  
reverse holds for non-Inupiats.  Also, the larger (absolute) marginal  
effects for Inupiats compared to non-Inupiats indicates that Inupiat  
subsistence participation relative to wage labor is more strongly  
influenced by time spent in wage labor.  This result is consistent with  
Stabler's (1990) observations for English-speaking Native males in  
Canada's NWT.  
AGE produces a significant upward effect on positive Inupiat  
subsistence participation, and the marginal effects grow with TIME.  The  
opposite holds for non-Inupiats.  As a proxy for human capital, AGE  
lowers subsistence opportunity costs and perhaps strengthens preferences  
for subsistence products among older Inupiats; these experiences are not  
shared by non-Inupiats.  Though not statistically significant, SCH  
reduces the P[TIME=0] for Inupiats and increases the probability of  
positive subsistence participation.  Diametric results are obtained for  
non-Inupiats.  The lack of statistical significance for Inupiats may  
result from the assimilative effect of more education countered by the  
effect of increasing wages on the ability to purchase subsistence  
capital.  
An increase in HHWORK lowers subsistence time allocation  
probabilities among non-Inupiats.  However, the difference between  TABLE 11.6 
Marginal Effects for Continuous Explanatory Variables 
Inupiat 
Subsistence 
Choice  MWORK  HHWORK  GET  GIVE  HHS  AGE  SCH  YLOCAL 
P[TIME=0]  0.0126  0.0000  0.0002  -0.0041  -0.0027  -0.0027  -0.0038  0.0002 
P[TIME=1]  -0.0042  0.0000  -0.0001  0.0014  0.0009  0.0009  0.0013  -0.0001 
P[TIME=2]  -0.0035  0.0000  0.0000  0.0011  0.0007  0.0008  0.0010  -0.0001 
P[TIME=3]  -0.0049  0.0000  -0.0001  0.0016  0.0011  0.0011  0.0015  -0.0001 
Non-Inupiat 
Subsistence 
Choice  MWORK  HHWORK  GET  GIVE  HHS  AGE  SCH  YLOCAL 
P[TIME =O]  -0.0047  0.0070  -0.0028  -0.0082  -0.0049  0.0019  0.0033  0.0009 
P[TIME=1]  0.0035  -0.0052  0.0020  0.0061  0.0036  -0.0014  -0.0024  -0.0007 
P[TIME=2]  0.0007  -0.0011  0.0004  0.0013  0.0007  -0.0003  -0.0005  -0.0001 
P[TIME=3]  0.0005  -0.0007  0.0003  0.0009  0.0005  -0.0002  -0.0004  -0.0001 34 
Inupiat and non-Inupiat effects is statistically significant, and HHWORK  
does not affect Inupiat subsistence participation at the margin.  We  
offer two interpretations of this result.  First, HHWORK may generate  
two opposing effects: (a) Increased wage labor among other household  
members increases earnings available for fixed subsistence inputs.  
Increases in these inputs raise the productivity of subsistence time.  
(b) Increased wage labor among other household members increases the  
burden of household chores falling on individual household members and  
tends to lower subsistence activity.  The latter effect may dominate for  
non-Inupiats.  For Inupiats (a) and (b) may be offsetting.  Second, the  
impact of wage labor for other household members is less for Inupiats  
because they draw on a more extended family network, beyond those in the  
household to aid in subsistence harvests.  
Statistically significant parameter estimates are obtained for  
GIVE and GET, as well as for the differences by ethnicity, GIVED and  
GETD.  A marginal increase in GIVE increases the probability of  
allocating some time to subsistence relative to wage labor for both  
ethnic groups.  A rise in GET tends to reduce subsistence probabilities  
for Inupiat residents, although the effect is quite small.  A reverse  
pattern occurs for non-Inupiats.  
Five of the six (absolute) marginal effects for GIVE and GET are  
larger for non-Inupiat respondents.  The Inupiat pattern of generalized  
reciprocity, as opposed to the non-Inupiat pattern of balanced  
reciprocity, may explain why Inupiat subsistence participation relative  
to wage labor appears to be less responsive to the gifts and giving of  
subsistence commodities.  Alternatively, the levels of Inupiat  
participation in GIVE and GET are nearly six times greater than for non-35 
Inupiats.  The impact of a marginal change in exogenous subsistence  
sharing may diminish with higher levels of sharing.  
The estimated effects of the binary explanatory variables are in  
Table 11.7.  These effects are the computed using the difference between  
p'w with the variable equal to unity or zero, holding the continuous  
variables at the Inupiat and non-Inupiat means.  The effect of ETHNIC  
shows that Inupiats allocate time to all positive (zero) levels of  
subsistence with greater (smaller) probability than non-Inupiat.  
Residency in Barrow (BRW) tends to lower the subsistence time  
probabilities for both Inupiat and non-Inupiat residents.  With  
exception of TIME=3, this effect is smaller for Inupiat respondents than  
for non-Inupiats.  The result supports Usher's (1981) hypothesis,  
suggesting that urban location increases Native attachment to the market  
economy, although the coefficient is not statistically significant.  
The impact of MAR is to increase all three positive subsistence  
time allocation probabilities for both Inupiat and non-Inupiat  
residents.  This result supports Kruse's (1992) hypothesis regarding  
marriage as an indicator of household cohesion, which enhances  
subsistence productivity.  
The GENDER parameter estimate is positive and significant although  
its corresponding ethnic difference is negative and insignificant.  
subsistence activity and labor force participation under an extreme  
condition of voluntary or involuntary joblessness.  Recall that a  
marginal change in MWORK increases the Inupiat's probability of not  
engaging in subsistence and lowers subsistence TIME probabilities by 1.3  
percent for Inupiat respondents that do participate in subsistence.  36 
TABLE I1.7  
Marginal Effects for Binary Explanatory Variables  
Explanatory  Value  Probabilities 
Variable 
P(TIME =O)  P(TIME=1)  P(TIME=2)  P(TIME=3) 
ETHNIC  0  0.7473  0.2144  0.0249  0.0134 
1  0.4255  0.3952  0.0927  0.0866 
Change:  -0.3218  0.1808  0.0678  0.0732 
BIM  Inupiat 
0  0.4286  0.3942  0.0919  0.0853 
1  0.4498  0.3867  0.0863  0.0772 
Change:  0.0212  -0.0075  -0.0056  -0.0081 
Non-Inupiat 
0  0.7538  0.2097  0.0239  0.0126 
1  0.7983  0.1756  0.0176  0.0085 
Change:  0.0445  -0.0341  -0.0063  -0.0041 
MAR  Inupiat 
0  0.4836  0.3730  0.0777  0.0657 
1  0.4207  0.3970  0.0938  0.0885 
Change:  -0.0629  0.0240  0.0161  0.0228 
Non-Inupiat 
0  0.8465  0.1368  0.0116  0.0051 
1  0.7473  0.2145  0.0248  0.0134 
Change:  -0.0992  0.0777  0.0132  0.0083 
GENDER  Inupiat 
0  0.5393  0.3466  0.0645  0.0496 
1  0.3813  0.4081  0.1047  0.1059 
Change:  -0.1580  0.0615  0.0402  0.0563 
Non-Inupiat 
0  0.8410  0.1414  0.1222  0.0054 
1  0.7686  0.1986  0.0127  0.0111 
Change:  -0.0724  0.0572  0.0095  0.0057 37 
TABLE 11.7 (Continued)  
Marginal Effects for Binary Explanatory Variables  
Explanatory  Value  Probabilities  
Variable  
P(TIME=0)  P(TIME =1)  P(TIME=2)  P(TIME=3)  I I  
1  
Inupiat  
0  0.4254  0.3953  0.0927  0.0866  
1  0.4550  0.3848  0.0849  0.0753  
Change:  0.0575  -0.0105  -0.0078  -0.0113  
Non-Inupiat  
0  0.7927  0.1801  0.0182  0.0090  
1  0.7929  0.1799  0.0182  0.0090  
Change:  0.0002  -0.0002  0.0000  0.0000  
MOB  Inupiat  
0  0.4427  0.3895  0.0880  0.0798  
1  0.4944  0.3681  0.0752  0.0623  
Change:  0.0517  -0.0214  -0.0128  -0.0175  
Non- Inupiat  
0  0.7875  0.1841  0.0190  0.0094  
1  0.8450  0.1381  0.0118  0.0051  
Change:  0.0575  -0.0460  -0.0072  -0.0043  
Males are more likely to allocate positive time to subsistence, a result  
supporting the view of male dominance in the subsistence process.  The  
(absolute) marginal effect of GENDER also is more pronounced for Inupiat  
respondents.  
Finally, the marginal impact of NOJOB is to decrease the  
probabilities of the three positive time allocation choices for both  
Inupiat and non-Inupiat residents and increase the probability of  
allocating zero time to subsistence.  This result conflicts with the  
marginal effect of MWORK and is evidence of complementarity between This  38 
gives the same direction of effect as that predicted from becoming  
unemployed or leaving the labor force when NOJOB m 1  (a 5 percent  
probability decline).  
Resolution of this apparent conflict may rest in distinguishing  
the differing effects of time and income scarcity on subsistence  
participation.  A marginal change in MWORK, taken in the context of 6-
to-10 month average annual levels of labor supply, will increase time  
scarcity and discourage home production of time intensive subsistence  
commodities.  A discrete change to NOJOB status represents a larger  
order impact that may sharply reduce wage income.  As show in Figure 2,  
the individual's ability to maintain and procure subsistence inputs and,  
therefore, to participate in subsistence diminishes.  
A decline in MWORK will lower time scarcity and raise subsistence  
hunting effort.  However, at some point, extended underemployment or  
complete job loss may produce income-scarcity effects that overwhelm  
those associated with time-scarcity.  39 
11.6  Conclusion  
Four conclusions emerge from this research.  First, Alaska's North  
Slope Inupiat appear to use natural resources in different manner from  
non-Inupiats.  Since underlying differences in resource valuation are  
likely to influence observed behavioral differences, policies related to  
management of Alaska public lands should take these differences into  
account.  
Second, the results confirm hypotheses from previous research and  
indicate that both tradition and economic incentives influence the  
allocation of time to subsistence relative to wage labor.  We confirm  
Kruse's (1992) predictions on the impact of marriage, age, and gender on  
subsistence time allocations and find strong support for the importance  
of a system of generalized reciprocity, as measured by GIVE and GET, on  
the relative time allocation decisions of North Slope residents,  
especially Inupiats.  However, we do not find significant effects for  
education, Barrow residency, or occupation for either Inupiat or non- 
Inupiats.  The absence of significance for education (SCH) contrasts  
with Stabler (1990) and Kruse (1992), and may occur because our model  
explicitly controls for factors such as demography and labor force  
participation, in addition to household composition and traditional  
practices, which education is sometimes thought to proxy.  The failure  
to find a significant effect of the labor force participation by other  
household members on Inupiat subsistence suggests that Inupiats draw on  
extended community resources beyond those available in the non-Inupiat  
household.  40 
Third, our results indicate that wage labor is an exogenous  
determinant of subsistence time allocation and may indicate the time  
allocation process is recursive.  North Slope residents first decide on  
labor supply and, second, on subsistence participation.  This finding  
does not diminish the importance of subsistence production as a part of  
household income, but does indicate that Inupiat residents have adapted  
to North Slope labor market conditions.  
Fourth, estimation results indicate an inverse relationship  
between the probability of subsistence and wage labor time among Inupiat  
residents.  This means that factors that tend to reduce employment, such  
as a general economic downturn would, at least initially, lead to  
increased subsistence activity.  It follows that the value of  
subsistence resources increase as labor market opportunities contract.  
Looking ahead, the imminent depletion of Prudhoe Bay oil reserves  
implies economic contraction along with more pressure to open up other  
Arctic lands to energy development.  Our results suggest that these  
lands gain value as subsistence resources as the pressure for their  
energy development grows.  41 
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11.8  Endnotes  
1.  Important sources of non-labor income not explicitly considered here  
include state and federal transfer payments and Native corporation  
dividends (Chance, 1987 and Huskey, 1992).  
2.  ASRC is one of thirteen Native Corporations created in the 1971  
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.  
3.  Alaska law prohibits the sale of most subsistence products (State of  
Alaska, 1978).  Since 1972, the Federal Marine Mammal Protection Act  
prohibits commercial hunting of most marine mammal species including  
seal, walrus, and Bowhead whale.  Observed differences in subsistence  
hunting patterns of North Slope Inupiat and non-Inupiat people are  
expected to reflect this constraint.  
4.  This discussion based on Braund, et al. (1989). 
5.  Pollak and Wachter (1975) show that if the household technology  
displays constant returns to scale and no jointness in production, then  
commodity demand is a function of implicit commodity prices (if,).  
Alternatively, if home production time generates direct utility  
(jointness) then commodity demand depends on preferences, as well.  In  
this study, we do not estimate commodity demands.  Following Becker  
(1965) we allow for direct utility from intermediate activities and  
assume that time can be uniquely allocated among activities.  
6.  Before answering this question, respondents completed a series of  
questions about their subsistence and wage labor activities.  The  
respondents include the employed and unemployed, as well as students,  
disabled, aged, and others not in the labor force.  
7.  The North Slope Borough sponsored the survey.  Details on survey  
design and methodology are available from the authors on request.  
8.  The wage rate is not included as an explanatory variable.  However,  
the empirical model estimated includes variables measuring education,  
demographic, and occupation attributes that proxy the respondent's  
wages.  This procedure is consistent with the human resources literature  
explaining wage patterns.  See for example, Tremblay (1990).  
9.  Household income (HHY) was excluded as an explanatory variable from  
the model because a) it is highly collinear with MWORK, b) it was not  
statistically significant when included, and c) the reported results are  
robust with respect to its omission.  45 
III.  MARKET POWER IN THE U.S. MOTOR CARRIER INDUSTRY  
III.1  Introduction  
During the 1980's, researchers have noted a trend towards  
increased concentration in the general freight, less-than-truckload  
(LTL) portion of the U.S. motor carrier industry (Enis and Morash, 1987;  
Kling, 1990; Rakowski, 1988 and 1990).  These researchers have  
questioned the appropriateness of deregulation, suggesting that large  
firms may take over the industry in the future if there is no government  
intervention.  Another set of studies suggest that the LTL motor carrier  
industry exhibits competitive behavior of the form that motivated  
regulation reform in 1980 (Ying, 1990; Ying and Keeler, 1991; Kerkvliet  
and McMullen, 1993).  
The important issue is not whether the industry is simply becoming  
more concentrated, but whether the increasingly concentrated industry is  
exerting monopoly power and acting in an anti-competitive manner.  The  
contribution of this research is the application of new industrial  
organization empirical techniques to determine the extent of trucking  
industry anti-competitive performance in the post-1980 deregulated  
environment.  
The LTL segment of the U.S. motor carrier industry primarily  
consists of non-specialized carriers that haul mostly intercity freight  
in shipments of less than 10,000 pounds using a network of hub and spoke  
terminals.1°  By comparison, truck load (TL) carriers serve relatively  
specialized commodity shippers.  Where as the TL segment of the industry  
is generally accepted to be competitive, the evidence is less clear with  46 
respect to the LTL segment (McMullen, 1987 and Winston, et al., 1990.)  
As shown in Table III.1, while the number of ICC certified motor  
carriers increased dramatically over the past decade, the number of  
Class I & II, Instruction 27 carriers, representing the LTL segment,  
declined by more than 60 percent (Xu, et al., 1993).  Three-, four-, and  
eight-firm concentration ratios have increased steadily since 1976.  
TABLE III.1  
U.S. Motor Carrier Industry Size and Concentration  
1976 - 1989 
Year  Number of  Number  Annual 
ICC  of ICC  Average  Concentration Ratios 
Certified  Class  Tonmiles  (Percent) 
Motor  I & II  LTL 
Carriers  Carriers  Carriers  3-Firm  4-Firm  8-Firm 
(Millions) 
1976  16,742  614  .14  .17  .24 
1977  16,606  111.3 
1978  16,874 
1980  18,045  498  .18  .21  .32 
1984  30,481  326 
1987  38,338  273  271.8 
1988  39,609 
1989  237  .35  .40  .52 
Source:  McMullen and Stanley, 1988.  
Xu, et al., 1993.  
Interstate Commerce Commission, 1945-1988.  47 
Motor carrier research has focussed on estimations of cost  
functions to obtain information on returns to scale.  Almost all studies  
have found evidence of constant technological returns to scale for both  
industry segments (McMullen, 1987; McMullen and Stanley, 1988; Grimm,  
Corsi, and Jarrell, 1988; Daughety and Nelson, 1987).  However, other  
work (Corsi and Stowers, 1991; McMullen and Tanaka, 1993) indicates that  
there may be networking economies or what Keeler (1989) calls "economies  
of integration" that give cost advantages to larger firms.  These  
"economies of integration", however, are difficult to capture using  
standard econometric cost function estimation techniques.  
The focus on cost structure looks at only a necessary, but not a  
sufficient, condition for the exercise of monopoly power.  Even if large  
firms do have cost advantages over small and the industry becomes  
increasingly concentrated, the industry could be behaving in an  
efficient manner as long as cost savings are passed along to consumers  
in the form of lower prices.  The real problem, from an economic  
efficiency perspective, occurs when large firms exert market power and  
price above marginal cost.  
Recent advances in the theory of duality and advances in  
econometric methods using flexible functional forms and non-linear  
estimation techniques have resulted in sophisticated empirical methods  
for the study of industry pricing behavior.  This new line of research  
is referred to by Bresnahan (1989) as the "new empirical industrial  
organization" (NEIO) framework.  The purpose of this study is to employ  
NEIO techniques to determine whether the increases in concentration  
observed in the post-1980 U.S. motor carrier industry have resulted in  
non-competitive industry pricing behavior.  48 
The chapter is organized as follows.  Following this introduction,  
section 111.2 introduces the NEIO model used as the theoretical basis  
for this study.  Section 111.3 provides an explanation of the empirical  
methodology and describes the data set used for the motor carrier  
industry.  Results are presented and discussed in section 111.4,  
followed by a summary of major conclusions in the final section.  49 
111.2  NEIO Model of Pricing Behavior  
The NEIO framework relies on formal profit maximizing theory to  
build structural econometric models designed for direct estimation of  
the degree of market power exerted by the firm or industry.  Market  
power is defined as the gap between equilibrium price and marginal cost  
(MC).  The NEIO approach produces direct estimates of MC which, under  
the assumption of profit maximizing equilibrium, provides a benchmark  
for comparison with observed price data.  A large price-cost margin  
(PCM) implies a high degree of market power exerted by the firm or  
industry under examination.  
To explore the relationship between market price and marginal  
cost, the NEIO approach begins with the structure of industry demand and  
cost.  The objective is to formulate and empirically estimate what is  
referred to as the representative firm's supply relation.'  In  
general, the firm's cost function, its demand curve, and its pricing  
behavior (conduct) represent the unknowns to be estimated.  Endogenous  
observable variables include the firm's output price (P) and quantity  
(q1).  Exogenous observable variables include input supply prices (w),  
firm attributes (a), and appropriate demand and supply shift variables  
(zd, and Z.). 
12  
Demand is usually expressed in price-dependent (inverse) form as 
P = p(qi+Q, Zd,rd),  (13) 
where rd is a vector of unknown demand parameters.  When output is  
homogeneous, Q=q,+(ii, where Q.J=Eqj for j*i.  The equation for firm long  
run minimum total cost is  50 
Ci  C(qi, w, a,re,)  (14) 
where a is a vector of firm attributes that control for the effects of 
heterogeneous commodities, and r, is a vector of unknown cost 
parameters. 
The firm's problem is to maximize profit: 
main_ 
Ci(*)]  (15) 
ql  
The firm's first order condition for profit maximization becomes:  
dP aQ  MCi = 0  for i = 1, .  (16) dQ aqi  I 
where MC, is firm i's marginal cost.  The above expression may be  
manipulated to give the supply relation formulation frequently  
encountered in the literature:  
P =  MCi  ei  dP 
(17) 
where 0, is aQ/aq the firm's conjectural variation and dP/dQ is the  
slope of the market demand curve.  Further simplification of (17)  
yields:  
P = MCi +  (18) 
where A, = -0,dP/dQ.  The form of A, indicates that monopoly power can  
arise either through rival behavior (80 or product differentiation  
(dP/dQ).  
Econometric estimation of A, is used to determine the presence or  
absence of market power.'  If A, is equal to zero, then the firm  
operates in a perfectly competitive market.  If A, is greater than zero,  
then the firm exerts some degree of monopoly power.  Note, A, is bounded  51 
from below by zero, since MC, cannot be greater than price in the long  
run.  The strength of the NEIO approach is that pricing behavior is not  
imposed a priori; the data determine this behavior.  52 
111.3  Empirical Methodology  
Under the assumption that demand and cost are properly specified,  
and that (13) and (14) contain independent and identically distributed  
(iid) random disturbance terms ed and e respectively, the supply  
relation (18) may be estimated using standard econometric techniques.  
The exact structure of the supply relation will depend on the form of  
the cost function.  For example, if the firm exhibits constant returns  
to scale, q, is separable from other arguments in the cost function and  
the marginal cost (MC,) will not depend on output.  
The general translog second order approximation of (14) is used in  
this study and offers advantages over alternative formulations of motor  
carrier long run cost.  First, the translog cost is a flexible  
functional form that enables explicit testing of the technology  
structure (e.g., homogeneity and returns to scale) and the application  
of duality theory to provide for possible efficiency gains in  
estimation.  Second, the translog cost function provides a convenient  
framework to interact firm attributes (a) with other cost function  
arguments.  Third, the general translog cost function is consistent with  
a long run equilibrium for the firm.  This specification is appropriate  
because LTL motor carriers regularly rent trucking services.  Their  
rolling stock is variable, even in the short run.  53 
The translog form of (14) is:  
log C(qi, w, a, r, ec)  = ao  + Yg (logqi) +  a  .  (logwi)
3  -7 
Em pm  (loga.) 
+ 7 
1
yQv (logqi) 2 
+  ajk ( logwj) (logwk) 
(19)  +  I). (loga.) (logan) 
+  pct./ (logqi) (logwi) 
+ E  (logn) (loga.) 
m  
+  Em Dqm (logq) (loga.) 
+ c 
where each variable is normalized by its geometric mean and e, is an  
additive disturbance term.  The indices j and k pertain to input prices,  
q, to output of the ith firm, and m and n to attributes.  Symmetry in  
cross-price derivatives and linear homogeneity in input prices imply:  
aik = aki  and  P. = 
a
j 
= 1 
a jk =  afic =  a jk =  (20) 
pce, = 0 
E  D  = 0 .  m  
Logarithmic differentiation of (19) with respect to an input price  
produces an expression for a conditional factor cost share equation:  
alOgC - 2a14:1  147, (3,11s).  j = ogwj  (21)  54 
where, by Shepard's lemma, Xj is the conditional factor demand for input  
j.  The share equations (21) are estimated jointly with the cost  
function to increase efficiency."  
Firm output, q, is measured as total annual tonmiles by Interstate  
Commerce Commission (ICC) Instruction 27 common carriers in 1988 (TM88).  
This output measure is equal to the product of total tons hauled and  
total distance traveled.  Four firm output attributes are included to  
control for the multidimensional aspects of tonmiles as a measure of  
output: average length of haul (ALH), average load (AL), average  
shipment size (AS), and insurance expenditures per tonmile (INS).  
ALH is found by dividing total tonmiles by total tons hauled.  
Firms with longer average lengths of haul are expected to have lower per  
unit costs as fixed costs associated with terminal expenses are spread  
over more units of output.  AL is found by dividing total tonmiles by  
total vehicle miles traveled.  Firms with higher average loads (measured  
in tons) will have lower per unit costs.  AS (measured in tons) is  
computed by dividing total tonmiles by the total number of shipments  
hauled.  Average shipment size controls for the consolidation and  
handling expenses associated with dealing with LTL traffic; firms  
handling larger shipments do not have to deal with as many transactions,  
thus they are expected to have lower costs.  Finally, higher valued  
commodities are expected to cost firms more because they often require  
more costly service quality (i.e., careful handling and faster service).  
These attribute measures are consistent with applications found  
throughout the motor carrier literature (Friedlaender and Spady, 1981;  
McMullen and Stanley, 1988; McMullen and Tanaka, 1993; Kerkvliet and  
McMullen, 1993; Grimm, Corsi, and Jarrell, 1989)  55 
The factors of production include fuel, labor, purchased  
transportation, and capital.  Definitions of input prices are summarized  
in Appendix A and are consistent with those used in previous studies  
(McMullen and Stanley, 1988).  Descriptions of all variables used in the  
cost function estimation are summarized in Table 111.2.  
Specification of the firm's supply relation follows from  
logarithmic differentiation of translog cost with respect to firm  
output:  
a log C  MCi 
ya+ygg(logqi) +EB  .(logsvi) +ED  (loga.)   .  alo gqi  AC,  m  gin 
(22)  
Solving (22) for MC gives:  
MCi = AC  [ycf+y  (log q)  (logwi) +  Dom  (logam)1,  (23) 
where AC, is firm average cost.  This result is substituted directly  
into (18) to yield the corresponding translog supply relation  
specification for estimation:  
P = <IIMCi> + liigi  + eB,  (18') 
where es is a random disturbance and <MCi> refers to the expression for  
MC, in (23).15  TABLE 111.2 
Variable Definitions and Summary Measures 
(Based on 184 Observations) 
Variable  Standard 
Variable Definition  Name  Mean  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
COST FUNCTION VARIABLES 
Ton Miles in 1988 (TM Units)  TM88  335,124.255  1,173,250.590  955.000  9,429,041.000 
Total Revenue/Total Cost (%)  TRTC  1.039  0.691  0.761  10.324 
Average cost (S /TM)  AC  0.470  0.393  0.041  2.429 
Price (TR/TM) ($)  P  0.471  0.395  0.040  2.400 
Average Load  AL  9.415  4.807  0.950  25.000 
Average Length of Haul  ALH  326.596  296.662  22.390  1,546.040 
Average Shipment Size  AS  3.549  6.001  0.051  35.983 
Insurance Cost/Ton Mile (S /TM)  INS  0.016  0.017  0.001  0.140 
Price of Fuel ($/Mile)  PF  0.680  0.249  0.000  1.751 
Price of Capital (S /Ton Mile)  PK  1.406  1.448  0.311  9.363 
Price of Labor (S /Employee /Year)  PL  35.529  9.394  11.002  56.694 
Price of Rented Capital (S /Ton Mile)  PR  1.127  0.472  0.004  3.476 
Fuel Cost Share (%)  MF  0.043  0.026  0.000  0.142 
Capital Cost Share (%)  MK  0.301  0.087  0.099  0.667 
Labor Cost Share (%)  ML  0.521  0.152  0.038  0.814 
Rented Capital Cost Share (%)  MRK  0.135  0.162  0.000  0.782 
DEMAND (INSTRUMENTS) 
Ton Miles in 1987 (TM Units)  TM87  304,986.940  1,091,547.548  1,021.000  8,628,463.000 
Binary Variable (=1 National Firm)  GROUP  0.065  0.248  0.000  1.000 
Output of Rival Firms 
within a Strategic Group  RIVAL  5,220,309.770  3,434,067.910  79,121.000  17,360,206.000 57 
Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) is used to estimate the  
supply relation (18') jointly with the cost function419), restrictions  
(20), and the factor share equations (21) under the assumption that  
cross equation disturbance terms are correlated.  Since P and q (the  
firm subscript is ignored here) are assumed to be jointly determined, it  
is likely that q (which is present in (18')), may not be independent of  
the disturbance terms ec, and e,.  Under these circumstances, single  
stage estimation would produce biased and inconsistent estimators for  
the elements of rc and r..m  This study interprets firm output as a  
stochastic regressor.  
Note that (18) does not require explicit incorporation of the  
slope of the demand curve.  However, demand side factors are implicit in  
1, and possibly MC as well (unless constant returns to scale prevail).  
If firm output is correlated with ec (i.e., q, endogenous), then two- 
stage methods are required to obtain consistent parameter estimates.  
The demand side could be estimated in a simultaneous equations framework  
or an instrumental variable could be calculated for firm output.  
We take the latter approach in this study for two reasons.  First,  
it is difficult to model firm specific demand in the absence of data on  
shipper market characteristics specific to individual trucking firms and  
markets.  Firm data are available only in a national cross-section.  
Furthermore, our unpublished empirical experiments with alternative  
direct and inverse trucking demand specifications suggest that the  
relationship between trucking rates and output quantities is weak.  
Second, a consistent estimator of reduced form parameters needed to  
predict q, using the instrumental variable approach only requires  58 
identification of relevant instruments that are correlated with q and  
contemporaneously uncorrelated with e, and e,.  
The estimation procedure begins with first stage estimation of  
qry = q[7'M87 , GROUP, RIVAL] ,  (24) 
where TM87 measures firm output in the previous year and the variables, 
GROUP and RIVAL measure strategic group effects and are designed to 
capture demand-side influences on firm output." 
The first stage coefficients obtained in (24) are used to  
calculate the instrumental variable q,, (see Appendix B).  Second stage  
parameter estimates OW are obtained by substituting predicted values  
q,  from the first stage estimation of (24) for actual firm output q in  
equations (18') through (21) and then proceeding with FIML.  
Strategic group theory suggests that firms in the same industry  
fall into clusters that exhibit distinct long run patterns in  
competitive behavior (Caves and Porter, 1977 and Tremblay, 1993).  
Authorities on the trucking industry suggest that LTL motor carriers may  
be divided into national and regional firms.  The national firms  
(Roadway Express, Inc., Consolidated Freightways, and Yellow Freight  
System, Inc.) operate along transcontinental routes and rely on regional  
carriers to disseminate their cargo.  Differences in strategic variables  
between national and regional firms in the LTL motor carrier industry  
are summarized in Table 111.3.  
Each of the strategic variables listed in Table 111.3 differs  
significantly between the national and regional groups as evidenced by  
their high t-statistics.  The national firms are larger as measured by  
output, they specialize more in LTL traffic and smaller shipment sizes,  59 
travel longer distances and carry greater average loads than regional  
carriers.  
Strategic group theory hypothesizes that firms compete with rival  
firms inside their strategic group.  Thus, national trucking firms are  
not in direct competition with the regional carriers, since they operate  
in different markets.  RIVAL measures tonmiles of output for rival firms  
within firm i's strategic group and is based on Tremblay (1985).  For  
national firms, RIVAL is defined as the total output of the other  
national firms.  For regional firms, RIVAL is defined as the total  
output produced by other regional firms operating in firm i's own state  
and in states contiguous to firm i's home state.  
Strategic group theory indicates further that, since firms in  
different strategic groups behave differently, the structure of their  
demand and cost functions may differ as well.  Accordingly, the supply  
relation (18') and cost function (19) are modified to admit strategic  
group effects.  In the supply relation, A is assumed to vary across  
national (AN) and regional firms (AR).  Large national firms have  
exhibited the greatest gains in terms of revenue and market share since  
deregulation.  If their increase in size has been due to the exercise of  
market power, then 4 should be significantly greater than zero.  This  
methodology allows for the possibility of market power for national  
firms, but not for regional, for instance.  
Finally, we explore whether national and regional carriers differ  
because of their marketing strategy or whether there is a real  
difference in their entire cost structure.  If they have different cost  
(and thus production) structures, then pooling national and regional  
data for the estimation of the cost function would bias the estimates of  60 
TABLE 111.3  
Strategic Differences Between National and Regional  
Strategic Groups  
in the U.S. Motor Carrier Industry  
Strategic  Standard  Sample  t-Stat  
Variable  Group  Mean  Error  Size  
Output	  R  195932.00  441891.07  181  -16.14  
N  8733057.00  914277.54  3  
RIVAL	  R  5035691.57  3142944.67  181  -19.72  
N  16358900.00  908781.21  3  
LTL  R  0.464  0.279  181  -10.85  
N  0.780  0.028  3  
ALH  R  311.03  272.78  181  -14.38  
N  1265.44  109.50  3  
AL  R  9.32  4.78  181  -11.21  
N  15.44  0.72  3  
AS  R  3.60  6.04  181  6.87  
N  0.52  0.01  3  
INS  R  0.016  0.017  181  8.43  
N  0.005  0.001  3  
P	  R  0.476  .040  181  8.77  
N  0.208  .014  3  
Note: R=Regional Group  
N=National Group  
marginal cost that are crucial to the derivation of the supply relation  
(18').  To admit differences in cost structure between the regional and  
national firms, (19) is estimated allowing for different intercepts  
between the two groups.  61 
111.4  Results  
Several models involving different strategic group effects were  
considered to explore whether national and regional carriers differ  
because of their pricing behavior or whether there is a real difference  
in their entire cost structure, or both.  If national and regional  
carriers have different cost structures, then pooling national and  
regional data for the estimation of the cost function would bias the  
estimates of marginal cost that are crucial to the derivation of the  
supply relation (18').  To admit differences in cost structure between  
the regional and national firms, (19) is estimated allowing for  
different intercepts between the two groups.  This equation is  
designated (19').  
To allow for strategic differences in pricing behavior, the market  
power parameter 1 in (18') is allowed to vary for national and regional  
firms.  This gives  
P = <MCi> + ARq1GROUPR +  1NqiGROUPN +  es,  (18") 
where the binary variable GROUPN (GROUPR) is equal to one for national  
(regional) firms and zero otherwise.  
The full model allowing for strategic group effects in both the  
cost structure and pricing behavior consisting of (18"), (19'), (20),  
and (21) is estimated using FIML.18  Also, several variations of the  
full model are considered.  At one extreme, strategic effects in the  
firm's cost structure and pricing behavior are restricted to be the same  
across national and regional groups.  This restricted model is estimated  
using (18'), (19), (20), and (21); in effect, national and regional firm  62 
data is pooled.  Also, two intermediate versions are estimated in which  
the full model is partially restricted.  For intermediate version #1 the  
cost function intercept is allowed to vary for national and regional  
firms while pricing behavior is restricted to be the same.  The nature  
of the restriction is reversed for intermediate version #2.  In this  
case, only pricing behavior is permitted to differ across national and  
regional firms.  Estimation results are summarized in Table 111.3.  
Detailed estimation results for each model are reported in Appendix C.  
Estimation results reported for all models are obtained by substituting  
the predicted values q1, from the first stage procedure using (24) for  
actual firm output (q).  The Hausmann specification test results  
reported in Table 111.4 favor implementation of the.instrumental  
19 20 variable estimator. 
Likelihood ratio test results reported in Table 111.4 indicate  
that the full model is not favored over the restricted and intermediate  
versions.  These results imply that neither the structure of cost nor  
the nature of pricing behavior differ for national and regional firms.  
Tests for equality of coefficients indicate that cost function intercept  
terms GROUP, and GROUPN in the full model are not statistically  
different at the .01 significance level."  
Estimation results indicate that the output elasticity of cost  
(coefficient on the log(q) term) is not significantly different from  
unity for all model versions.22  Furthermore, the parameter estimates  
for log(q) are not statistically different across all model versions."  
These results concerning firm technology suggest that networking  
economies (Keeler, 1989) size economies (Kling, 1990), strategic  63 
Table 111.4  
Coefficient Estimates for U.S. Motor Carrier Industry in 1988  
Model of Strategic Group Effect 
Full: 
Restricted:  SG Effect 
Independent  No SG  Version  Version  in Cost & 
Variables  Effect  #1  #2  Supply 
Cost Function 
Constant  11.500  11.515 
(32.6829)  (32.6446) 
GROUP,  12.012  12.112 
(4.8946)  (1.5352) 
GROUP,  11.509  11.500 
(32.4246)  (31.2769) 
log(q)  1.252  1.238  1.261  1.228 
(7.6794)  (7.1797)  (7.9133)  (6.6173) 
Supply Relation 
A  2.249E-08  1.004E-08 
(0.1575)  (0.0615) 
AN  2.195E-08  7.698E-09 
(1.4717)  (0.0106) 
AR  -9.947E-09  2.930E-09 
(-0.0858)  (0.1429) 
Log of Likelihood  716.147  717.327  716.421  717.398 
Function 
Likelihood Ratio  2.502  0.142  1.954  -
Test 
Hausmann Test  33.513  46.235  48.650  64.788 
Observations  184  184  184  184 64 
marketing (Enis and Morash, 1987), or other factors account for cost  
differences between the national and regional firms.  
Estimates of the market power parameters (A, AN, and AR) are  
positive in all but one case, but not statistically different from zero  
for all model specifications.  Even when ignoring the absence of  
statistical significance, the magnitude of the market power parameters  
imply a modest market power effect on price.  For example, the price  
cost margin [(P-MC)/MC] for the average firm in the restricted model is  
1.93 percent.  These results provide evidence that, despite observed  
increases in industry concentration, there is an absence of market power  
in the U.S. motor carrier industry following deregulation.  
The absence of strong evidence of market power in the national  
segment of the trucking industry despite the presence of only three  
large firms suggests that these markets may be contestable.  If a large  
national firm try monopoly pricing in a particular corridor, a regional  
firm could easily enter that network segment and compete away the excess  
profit.  
The results for regional firms suggest an absence of factors that  
give rise to local monopoly conditions.  For example, entry barriers  
imposed by differing intrastate regulations do not favor the incumbent  
regional carrier.  65 
111.5  Conclusion  
There are four major conclusions from this study.  First, the  
results from estimation of the supply relation indicate the prevalence  
of competitive pricing behavior amongst general freight motor carriers  
nearly a decade after the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.  Thus, the observed  
trend toward increased industry concentration does not imply anti- 
competitive performance in the sense of rising price-cost margins.  The  
substantial reduction in LTL carriers following regulation reform in  
1980 may reflect superior efficiency of surviving firms (Stigler, 1958).  
Second, evidence from this study suggests that differences among  
regional and national carriers are due to marketing strategies rather  
than to differences in production technology or pricing behavior.  
Furthermore, it appears that an industry structure consisting of three  
large national firms and a fringe of regional carriers can be  
competitive.  Regional carriers may be perceived as potential entrants  
to national markets, curbing the exercise of market power in national  
markets.  The theory of contestable markets (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig,  
1988) presents an alternative to Stigler's (1958) survivor test for  
reconciling the prevalence of competitive behavior in the face of rising  
concentration.  
Third, the results here show that the NEIO approach is a  
satisfactory research method even in the absence of exerted market  
power.  Past studies (eg., Applebaum, 1982, Porter, 1983, and Suslow,  
1986) have focused on industries where market power is generally  
acknowledged to exist.  66 
Finally, empirical tests consistently indicate that output is  
endogenous, as predicted in a model of profit maximization in a  
deregulated setting.  Evidence of endogenous output does not necessarily  
imply that firms exert monopoly power.  It suggests only that firms  
choose output.  A key objective of this study is to focus on the extent  
that firm output decisions influence market price.  An instrumental  
variable procedure is used to control for correlation between the  
regressor, output, and the disturbance terms in the cost function and  
supply relation.  The results are consistent with past studies in  
finding no compelling evidence of scale economies even after correcting  
for endogeneity.  
The conclusion that the U.S. motor carrier industry is competitive  
is supported here both by findings of constant technological returns to  
scale and by evidence showing the absence of market power in the  
industry.  Accordingly, there is no valid economic argument for  
reimposition of regulatory policy in the U.S. motor carrier industry.  67 
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111.7  Endnotes  
10.  The ICC broadly classifies general commodity carriers into (1)  
those that derived at least 75 percent of their revenues over the past  
three years from intercity shipments (Instruction 27 firms) and  (2)  
commodity carriers not covered by Instruction 27 that commonly handle  
specialized shipments in excess of 10,000 pounds (Instruction 28 firms).  
See American Trucking Associations, (1988 and 1989).  
11.  Supply "relation" instead of supply function follows from the same  
reasoning that a price-searching monopolist does not have a supply  
curve: a one-to-one correspondence between price and firm quantity does  
not exist.  
12.  Bold letters indicate vectors.  
13.  The subscript i indicates that A, may vary across firms by factors  
representing potential sources of market power.  See, for example Porter  
(1983) and Tremblay and Tremblay (1993).  
14.  One share equation in (21) is dropped to avoid perfect  
multicollinearity, since the shares sum to one.  The choice is arbitrary  
since full information maximum likelihood is used for estimation.  
15.  An alternative formulation of the supply relation is sometimes used  
(Porter, 1983 and Ying and Keeler, 1991).  Rearrange (16) to give  
c/20  aP.gi]   (16.1) 
dQ P  Q  
This may be rewritten as  
0.s.   (16.2)  + -1-1]  
where q is the market price elasticity of demand and s, is firm i's  
Moving the bracketed term in (16.2) to the  share of industry output.  
right-hand-side gives  
1 P = miMCi +  e  where  mi , 
0.s. I.  (16.3) 
1  
Here the parameter m is bounded from below by 1, with m=1 consistent  
with perfectly competitive pricing behavior and m>1 with exerted market  
power.  One further adjustment is introduced by multiplying through  
(16.3) by 1 /AC,.  This gives  71 
TR  I MC 
(16.4)  sm TC  \ ACI 
Estimation results using this formulation (not reported) are  
That  comparable to those using the additive formulation given in (18').  
is, the coefficient for m is not statistically different than unity for  
a wide variety of econometric specifications.  
16.  For example, Kling (1990) fails to consider endogeneity of q in his  
econometric specification of a supply relation using a sample of  the 23  
largest LTL firms in 1987.  Consequently, his estimates of economies of  
size and price-cost margins may contain specification bias.  
TM87 is not contemporaneously correlated with c, provided e, is not  17.  
autocorrelated.  
18.  The cost function (7) with restrictions (8) and share equations  (9)  
were estimated initially using FIML in order to obtain start values for  
the full system.  Parameter estimates (not reported) are consistent with  
those from previous studies.  
19.  A Hausmann specification test was used to test the null hypothesis  
that q is independent of the disturbance terms in the cost function  and  
supply relation (ie., rFDL for the entire system is consistent and  
efficient) against the alternative hypothesis that q is stochastic (ie.,  
rye, is consistent).  Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic, (rw  
is distributed x200, where r, is a k- rFIML) 9 [rlIV  nnPIL]  (ru/  rFipc) 2 
element vector of coefficients corresponding to terms in (18"), (19'),  
(20), and (21) that contain q.  it, is the corresponding k-dimensional  
partition of the variance-covariance matrix for respective IV and FIML  
estimators.  For the full model, the test statistic, 64.788 exceeds the  
critical value 24.72 for a e variate with .01 significance and k=11  
degrees of freedom, supporting the hypothesis that output is stochastic.  
Comparable results are obtained for the restricted and intermediate  
models.  
20.  A Goldfeld-Quandt test is used to test the null hypothesis that the  
disturbance terms in the cost equation and supply relation are  
homoskedastic.  The middle 24 observations are removed from the sample  
leaving 73 observations each for the low output and the high output  
segments of the industry.  The null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the  
.05 significance level for both equations.  The values of the test  
statistics are 0.1550 (cost) and 0.0222 (supply).  The critical value  
for an F(73,73;.05)=1.50.  72 
21. The t-test for equality of GROUP, (i=N,R) coefficients for intermediate  
version #1 is 1.967.  The null hypothesis (equality) is rejected at the  
0.1 and 0.05, but not the 0.01 significance levels.  The t-test for GROUP,  
(i =N,R) coefficient equality in the full model (t=1.1621) favors the null  
at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels.  
22.  The null hypothesis that the coefficient 1.228 in the full model is  
equal to unity is not rejected at the .05 significant level.  
23. The t-test for equality of coefficients on log(q) is 0.708 for the  
full and restricted models; 0.283 for the full and intermediate #1 models;  
0.975 for the full and intermediate #2 models.  73 
IV.  CONCLUSION  
Chief among all the conclusions that emerge from this work is  
that, while economic analysis can not explain the many dimensions of  
human behavior, it does provide an enormously useful framework for  
evaluating (i) certain forms of behavior that may not commonly be viewed  
as economic (subsistence hunting) or (ii) economic behavior that does  
not clearly fall within the parameters of a particular structure or  
school of thought (motor carrier pricing).  
The results from the analysis of North Slope subsistence  
participation in part II indicate that both economic and cultural  
factors determine the subsistence time allocation decision.  Subsistence  
is linked importantly to economics in two ways.  First, a marginal  
increase in wage labor participation (i.e., a shift from under-
employment to full-employment) reduces subsistence participation.  
Second, complete job loss also reduces subsistence participation.  The  
first case may reflect time scarcity effects while the second case is  
likely to transmit the effect of income scarcity.  The latter result  
provides evidence that subsistence practices are somewhat cash  
dependent.  
The strong statistical significance of explanatory variables  
measuring gift giving and receiving suggest that traditional sharing  
practices still play an important role in the modern mixed  
wage/subsistence economy.  This implies that an individual's level of  
utility can be importantly linked to their perception of community  
wellbeing.  
The results from part III suggest that in spite of a recent trend  74 
toward increased revenue concentration and differences in the structure  
of cost between national and regional carriers, the industry pricing  
behavior is competitive.  To the extent that market power is exerted, it  
is likely to occur among regional carriers that may benefit from some  
form of specialized trucking service or local monopoly conditions.  
The applied microeconomic analysis contained in parts II and III  
draws from two research techniques:  First, theoretic concepts and  
quantitative techniques used in other research applications may be  
appropriate for use in a new set of problems.  The dependent variable  
TIME in part II is a case in point.  It attempts to operationalize  
Becker's (1965) theoretical notions of time allocation.  The analysis in  
part III combines NEIO and Strategic Group theories in a model of firm  
pricing behavior.  
Second, in order to understand and correctly model the process  
generating the data it is important to incorporate salient features of  
the institutional setting relevant to the hypothesis under  
investigation.  Inclusion of the cultural variables GIVE and GET and the  
variable HHWORK to measure the interaction among household members  
provide examples from part II.  The application of switching regression  
techniques in part III addresses the dichotomous, national/regional  
structure of the U.S. motor carrier industry.  75 
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APPENDIX A  
All data for the computation of cost and factor prices are from the  
1988 Motor Carrier Annual Report.  Total cost (C) is calculated to include  
a 12 percent return to capital  
C = TOE + 0.12 * (NOPE + WC),  (Al) 
where TOE is total operating expense, NOPE is net operating property and  
equipment, and WC is net current assets, or working capital.  A real value  
for net operating property and equipment is obtained by deflating the 1988  
dollar values using a ten year average of the producer's durable equipment  
implicit price deflator for trucks.  
The price of labor (PL) is the firm's total employee compensation  
divided by the total number of employees.  The price of rented capital  
(PR)  is total expenditures on purchased transportation divided by the  
total number of rented vehicle miles.  The price of capital  (PK)  is  
computed by dividing residual expenses (obtained by subtracting total  
fuel, labor, and purchased capital expenditures from total cost) by net  
operating property and equipment plus working capital.  
Finally, the price of fuel (PF) is calculated as total fuel and oil  
expense divided by an estimate of the number of gallons of fuel used.  We  
assume that trucks average 5 miles per gallon and estimate gallons by  
dividing total  vehicle miles by  5.  For those firms not reporting  
purchased transportation or fuel expenses, regional averages were used as  
proxies for their PF and PR.  Firms are assigned to regions according to  
the state in which the firm is located.  Although there are 267 Section 27  
firms listed, only 174 firms all the data required for this analysis.  82 
APPENDIX B  
Equation (24) was estimated under a variety of specifications.  
All versions use dummy variables for each strategic group and omit the  
constant term.  The dummy GROUPN (GROUPR) is equal to one for national  
(regional) firms and zero otherwise.  As shown in Table B.1, F-test  
results favor model version #3 and suggest that state economic factors  
(GSP and HWY), firm attributes, and ICC regional dummies are not jointly  
significant explanatory variables for post-deregulation trucking firm  
output.  In addition, version #3 generated predicted values, q, that  
are positive over the entire range of observations and provide  
reasonably closed approximations for actual output.  
The statistically significant coefficient for the GROUPN intercept  
dummy is consistent with the substantially greater output levels  
produced by national firms over regional firms.  The results indicate  
that tonmiles in the previous period (TM87) interacted with GROUPR is  
positive and statistically significant.  The effect of an increase in  
previous period output for national firms (TM87*GROUPN) is negative, but  
not significant.  
The coefficient for RIVAL *GROUPR is small and not significantly  
different from zero.  This indicates that a regional firm's level of  
production is not affected by a change in the output produced by rival  
firms in its region.  However, the large, negative, and statistically  
significant coefficient for RIVAL*GROUPN indicates that national firm i  
reduces its output in response to an increase in output by competing  
national firms.  Differences in firm response to the actions of rivals  
may reflect a difference in the structure of the two markets.  TABLE B.1  
OLS Coefficient Estimates for Alternative Instrumental Variable Specifications for  TM (Ton Miles)  
Full IV Specification  Restricted Version #1  Restricted Version #2 
R-Squared  0.9933  0.9927  0.9925 
Adj R-Squared  0.9925  0.9922  0.9923 
F-test  0.6444  1.2796 
Critical Value  2.21=F0(5.173{.05)  1.67=r(150631.05) 
No. Observations  184  184  184 
Variable  Estimate  t-statistic  Estimate  t-statistic  Estimate  t-statistic 
GROUP.  0.1987E+08  5.7504***  20759700.0  6.1215***  20892400.0  6.1963*** 
GROUP.  -48061.9  -1.0069  -23305.2  -0.6499  2319.75  0.1569 
TM87.  0.3785  1.6992*  0.302  1.3864  0.2927  1.3528 
TM87.  1.0543  42.7673***  1.066  45.7274***  1.0663  56.0937*** 
RIVAL.  -0.8743  -7.4956***  -0.8871  -7.7044***  -0.8893  -7.7663*** 
RIVAL.  -0.2197E-02  -0.5540  0.1336E-02  0.5281  0.1449E-02  0.5945 
GSP  -128.814  -1.1172 
HWY  -.629222  -0.1571 
ALH  -33.6051  -0.7452  -30.9829  -0.7669  
AS  2522.65  1.3478  1700.5  0.9451  
AL  3871.22  1.6570*  1902.91   0.8390  
INS  -306988.0  -0.5136  -437699.0  -0.7431  
LTL  77581.4  1.8049*  41223.1  1.0168  
H2  25869.5  0.6905  
H3  49567.7  1.1725  
H4  39676.3  0.8263  
H5  19040.2  0.3565  
H6  15895.1  0.3313  
H7  66943.5  1.2197  
H8  61527.0  1.2432  
H9  -26907.8  -0.6514  
Significant at the 0.1 level  
**   Significant at the 0.05 level  
***   Significant at the 0.01 level  84 
APPENDIX C  
The tables in this appendix provide detailed results for  
estimation of the empirical models summarized in Table 111.4  TABLE C.1  
Coefficient Estimates for Restricted Model: No Strategic  Group Effects  
Parameter  Estimate 
CONST  11.49990 
Q  1.25188 
Q*AL  -0.01146 
Q*ALH  -0.04957 
Q*AS  0.03668 
Q*INS  0.14145 
Q*PF  -0.00240 
Q*PK  -0.01155 
Q*PL  0.01131 
Q*PR  0.00263 
Q*Q  -0.02530 
AL  -0.31922 
ALH  -0.67286 
ALH*ALH  -0.03750 
ALH*AS  0.07842 
ALH*INS  -0.33382 
ALH*PL  -0.07488 
AL*AL  0.20996 
AL*ALH  -0.11742 
AL*AS  -0.12865 
AL*INS  -0.06444 
AL*PL  0.04969 
AS  -0.15901 
AS*AS  0.11294 
AS*PL  -0.07662 
INS  0.23132 
INS*AS  0.00015 
INS*INS  -0.09087 
PF  0.05420 
PF*AL  -0.01316 
PF*ALH  0.01438 
PF*AS  0.01378 
PF*INS  -0.00119 
PF*PF  0.00819 
t-statistic  
32.68290***  
7.67943***  
-0.10901  
-0.54758  
0.52981  
1.74807*  
-1.13138  
-1.11219  
1.04602  
0.18328  
-0.39985  
-0.83788  
-2.31696**  
-0.12235  
0.66229  
-1.36137  
-2.93704***  
0.47382  
-0.44904  
-0.89355  
-0.22253  
1.41063  
-0.77306  
0.94491  
-5.70216***  
0.59584  
0.00104  
-0.30760  
9.98000***  
-1.96862**  
3.06124***  
6.47138***  
-0.25299  
5.01045***  
Parameter   Estimate  t-statistic  
PK  0.32837  11.97060***  
PK*AL  0.00510  0.19134  
PK*ALH  0.04401  2.12326**  
PK*AS  0.02475  2.33582**  
PK*INS  0.03330  1.49424  
PK*PF  -0.00011  -0.04511  
PK*PK  -0.00579  -0.51598  
PK*PR  0.01262  1.03835  
PL*INS  0.01833  0.60842  
PL*PF   -0.01238  -3.41199***  
PL*PK   0.45677  11.88170***  
PL*PK  -0.00673  -0.52448  
PL*PL  0.07551  3.35453***  
PL*PR  -0.05640  -2.16142**  
PR   0.16066  3.22777***  
PR*AL  -0.04163  -0.85190  
PR*ALH  0.01649  0.52766  
PR*AS   0.03809  2.31269**  
PR*INS  -0.05043  -1.25974  
PR*PF  0.00430  1.29150  
PR*PR  0.03948  1.02737  
A   2.2478E-08  0.15749  
Log-Likelihood Ratio  716.147  
Number of Observations  174  
Equation  R-Square  
Cost  0.865 
Fuel Share  0.488  *  Significant at the 0.1  level 
Capital Share  0.094  **  Significant at the 0.05 level 
Labor Share  0.435  *** Significant at the 0.01 level 
Supply Reln  0.312 TABLE C.2  
Coefficient Estimates for Intermediate Model: Strategic Group Effects on Cost Intercept  
Parameter  Estimate 
GROUP.  12.01200 
GROUP.  11.50910 
Q  1.23749 
Q*AL  -0.00587 
Q*ALH  -0.05905 
Q*AS  0.04047 
Q*INS  0.13434 
Q*PF  -0.00244 
Q*PK  -0.01166 
Q*PL  0.01164 
Q*PR  0.00246 
Q *Q  -0.03798 
AL  -0.30190 
ALH  -0.68344 
ALH*ALH  -0.03397 
ALH*AS  0.07580 
ALH*INS  -0.33151 
ALH*PL  -0.07492 
AL*AL  0.20240 
AL*ALH  -0.11737 
AL*AS  -0.11982 
AL*INS  -0.05963 
AL*PL  0.05017 
AS  -0.15669 
AS*AS  0.10631 
AS*PL  -0.07692 
INS  0.22549 
INS*AS  0.00290 
INS*INS  -0.08909 
PF  0.05407 
PF*AL  -0.01311 
PF*ALH  0.01433 
PF*AS  0.01376 
PF*INS  -0.00127 
PF*PF  0.00821 
t-statistic  
4.89461***  
32.42460***  
7.17974***  
-0.05563  
-0.66376  
0.59010  
1.68702*  
-1.16073  
-1.14749  
1.10446  
0.18212  
-0.55614  
-0.78802  
-2.36257**  
-0.10754  
0.62796  
-1.33665  
-2.94469***  
0.45990  
-0.44579  
-0.80930  
-0.20262  
1.42404  
-0.76401  
0.90009  
-5.68933***  
0.57754  
0.02020  
-0.29593  
9.85625***  
-1.96589**  
3.01965***  
6.48049***  
-0.26839  
5.05261***  
Parameter  Estimate  t-statistic  
PK   0.32808  12.02100***  
PK*AL  0.00513  0.19130  
PK*ALH  0.04413  2.12764**  
PK*AS  0.02472  2.37744**  
PK*INS  0.03314  1.49018  
PK*PF  -0.00007  -0.02987  
PK*PK  -0.00593  -0.52731  
PK*PR  0.01258  1.03969  
PL*INS  0.01794  0.58933  
PL*PF  -0.01241  -3.43422***  
PL*PK  0.45693  11.90300***  
PL*PK  -0.00658  -0.51335  
PL*PL  0.07544  3.33379***  
PL*PR  -0.05645  -2.14842**  
PR  0.16093  3.21250***  
PR*AL  -0.04219  -0.86314  
PR*ALH  0.01646  0.52282  
PR*AS  0.03844  2.36662**  
PR*INS  -0.04982  -1.23172  
PR*PF  0.00427  1.28279  
PR*PR  0.03960  1.02564  
I  1.0044E-08  0.06153  
Log-Likelihood Ratio  717.327  
Number of Observations  184  
Equation  R-Square  
Cost  0.868 
Fuel Share  0.488  *  Significant at the 0.1  level 
Capital Share  0.094  **  Significant at the 0.05 level 
Labor Share  0.435  *** Significant at the 0.01 level 
Supply Reln  0.321 TABLE C.3  
Coefficient Estimates for Intermediate Model: Strategic Group Effects in Supply Relation  
Parameter  Estimate  
CONST  11.51520  
Q  1.26092  
Q*AL  -0.01302  
Q*ALH  -0.05019  
Q*AS  0.03729  
Q*INS  0.13817  
Q*PF  -0.00244  
Q*PK  -0.01164  
Q*PL  0.01153  
Q*PR  0.00256  
Q*Q  -0.02251  
AL  -0.31815  
ALH  -0.67251  
ALH*ALH  -0.03657  
ALH*AS  0.07689  
ALH*INS  -0.33308  
ALH*PL  -0.07485  
AL*AL  0.21152  
AL*ALH  -0.11701  
AL*AS  -0.12496  
AL*INS  -0.06243  
AL*PL  0.04974  
AS  -0.15870  
AS*AS  0.11099  
AS*PL  -0.07673  
INS  0.22809  
INS*AS  0.00134  
INS*INS  -0.09062  
PF  0.05410  
PF*AL  -0.01315  
PF*ALH  0.01438  
PF*AS  0.01378  
PF*INS  -0.00120  
PF*PF  0.00820  
t-statistic  
32.64460***  
7.91327***  
-0.12450  
-0.56204  
0.53466  
1.70664*  
-1.14790  
-1.12216  
1.07438  
0.17870  
-0.38094  
-0.83910  
-2.32943  
-0.12007  
0.65602  
-1.35907  
-2.93463**  
0.48038  
-0.45022  
-0.87217  
-0.21675  
1.42054  
-0.77362  
0.92904  
-5.69787***  
0.58832  
0.00943  
-0.30713  
9.87597***  
-1.96915**  
3.06218***  
6.46281***  
-0.25496  
5.01635***  
Parameter  Estimate  t-statistic  
PK  0.32818  11.92130***  
PK*AL  0.00508  0.19016  
PK*ALH   0.04408  2.13352**  
PK*AS  0.02478  2.34448**  
PK*INS   0.03339  1.50053  
PK*PF  -0.00010  -0.04058  
PK*PK  -0.00584  -0.51937  
PK*PR  0.01262  1.03923  
PL*INS  0.01812  0.59947  
PL*PF  -0.01239  -3.41588***  
PL*PK  -0.00669  -0.52054  
PL*PK   0.45707  11.83520***  
PL*PL  0.07555  3.34414***  
PL*PR  -0.05647  -2.15652**  
PR   0.16065  3.17596***  
PR*AL  -0.04167  -0.85449  
PR*ALH  0.01639  0.52339  
PR*AS  0.03816  2.32973**  
PR*INS  -0.05031  -1.24802  
PR*PF  0.00429  1.28513  
PR*PR  0.03956  1.02681  
I.  2.1954E-08  0.17017  
I.  -9.9465E-09  -0.08577  
Log-Likelihood Ratio  716.421  
Number of Observations  184  
Equation  R-Square  
Cost  0.866  
Fuel Share  0.488  *  Significant at the 0.10 level  
Capital Share  0.094  **  Significant at the 0.05 level  
Labor Share  0.435  *** Significant at the 0.01 level  
Supply Reln  0.316  TABLE C.4  
Coefficient Estimates for Full Model: Strategic Group Effects in Cost Intercept and Supply Relation  
Parameter  Estimate  t-statistic 
Parameter  Estimate  t-statistic 
GROUP. 
GROUP. 
12.1115 
11.4998 
1.53519 
31.27690*** 
PK 
PK*AL 
PK*ALH 
0.32814 
0.00514 
0.04410 
12.10230*** 
0.19160 
2.11786** 
Q 
Q*AL 
1.22776 
-0.00348 
6.61729*** 
-0.03307 
PK*AS 
PK*INS 
0.02469 
0.03305 
2.37506** 
1.48300 
Q*ALH 
Q*AS 
-0.06069 
0.04074 
-0.65616 
0.59651 
PK*PF 
PK*PK 
-0.00007 
-0.00593 
-0.03025 
-0.52705 
Q*INS 
Q*PF 
0.13464 
-0.00243 
1.70310* 
-1.15225 
PK*PR  0.01257  1.03796 
Q*PK 
Q*PL 
Q*PR 
-0.01162 
0.01158 
0.00247 
-1.14884 
1.11429 
0.18775 
PL*INS 
PL*PF 
PL*PK 
0.01798 
-0.01241 
0.45676 
0.593146 
-3.43550*** 
12.0915*** 
Q*Q  -0.04269  -0.59839  PL*PK  -0.00657  -0.51301 
AL 
ALH 
-0.29906 
-0.68618 
-0.77713 
-2.28417** 
PL*PL 
PL*PR 
0.07540 
-0.05642 
3.32921*** 
-2.14183** 
ALH*ALH 
ALH*AS 
ALH*INS 
ALH*PL 
AL*AL 
AL*ALH 
AL*AS 
-0.03375 
0.07636 
-0.33154 
-0.07495 
0.19917 
-0.11758 
-0.12060 
-0.10505 
0.62496 
-1.31680 
-2.95563*** 
0.45097 
-0.44398 
-0.80388 
PR 
PR*AL 
PR*ALH 
PR*AS 
PR*INS 
PR*PF 
PR*PR 
0.16100 
-0.04226 
0.01652 
0.03847 
-0.04975 
0.00427 
0.03957 
3.29762*** 
-0.86630 
0.52249 
2.35145** 
-1.23903 
1.28469 
1.02326 
AL*INS  -0.06074  -0.20532 
AL*PL  0.05024  1.42110  1.  7.6982E-09  0.010601 
la  2.9299E-08  0.142869 
AS  -0.15667  -0.76233 
AS*AS 
AS*PL 
0.10623 
-0.07692 
0.90423 
-5.68161*** 
Log-Likelihood Ratio 
Number of Observations 
717.398 
184 
INS  0.22550  0.57182 
INS*AS 
INS*INS 
PF 
PF*AL 
PF*ALH 
0.00255 
-0.08948 
0.05411 
-0.01312 
0.01432 
0.01772 
-0.29616 
9.91724*** 
-1.96680** 
2.99960*** 
Equation 
Cost 
Fuel Share 
Capital Share 
Labor Share 
R-Square 
0.867 
0.488 
0.094 
0.435 
*  Significant at the 0.1 level 
**  Significant at the 0.05 level 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level 
PF*AS 
PF*INS 
0.01376 
-0.00128 
6.47684*** 
-0.27026 
Supply Relation  0.319 
PF*PF  0.008207  5.05267*** 